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THE SUM OF ITS PARTS:
THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
IN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS
Jeremy R. McClane*
This Article examines the impact of the quality of a lawyer’s working
relationship with his or her client on one of the most important types of
capital markets deal in a company’s existence: its initial public offering
(IPO). Drawing on data from interviews with equity capital markets
lawyers at major law firms, and analyzing data from IPOs in the United
States registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission between
June 1996 and December 2010, this study finds a strong association
between several measures of IPO performance and the familiarity between
the lead underwriter and its counsel, as measured by the number of times a
particular law firm serves as counsel to a managing underwriter within a
relatively short time period. Performance is gauged according to a stock’s
opening day returns, price performance over thirty, sixty, and ninety
trading days, correct price revision, litigation rates, and the speed at which
deals are completed. I also analyze the relationships between the lawyers
for the lead underwriter and the lawyers for the issuer. The analysis shows
some benefits from familiarity, albeit generally smaller than those
associated with the underwriter-lawyer relationship. In all cases, the
positive effects of repeated interaction diminish the further back in time the
previous collaborations occurred. To rule out selection and reverse
causality, I perform a number of tests using smaller subsets of the data to
remove observations that are plausibly selection driven. I also show that
the relationships between familiarity and deal quality occur independently
of the level of the lawyers’ experience.
These findings support the conclusion that lawyers’ relational skill can
positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of substance and
process knowledge. I hypothesize that the core advantage of repeated
interaction is the formation of more effective lawyer-client team dynamics.

* Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. I am indebted for the
helpful advice and input of many friends and colleagues in undertaking this project. In
particular, I am grateful for advice and feedback from Bob Bordone, Stephen Burbank, Jill
Fisch, Jonah Gelbach, James Kwak, Patricia McCoy, Peter Siegelman, Joseph Singer,
Michael Sinkinson, Tobias Barrington Wolff, and workshop participants at the University of
Connecticut School of Law, Cardozo School of Law, and the University of Richmond
School of Law. All errors are my own.
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INTRODUCTION
To what extent does familiarity among lawyers, and between lawyers and
their clients, impact the outcome of a deal, even independently of the
lawyers’ expertise? The question is significant given that clients frequently
choose their counsel based, at least in part, on relationships and past
experiences with counsel.1 The question is also important as part of the
ongoing discussion of what value lawyers add for clients generally.2 In a
transactional setting, as in many others, lawyers do not perform their work
in isolation, but in concert with clients and other parties who shepherd
transactions to completion.3 The output of a transaction is a collective work
product, and therefore, an inquiry of what value lawyers add cannot be
disentangled from an inquiry of what value can be created through effective
working relationships amongst lawyers and clients.4 And while many
would agree that there are intangible benefits from familiarity, it is not
obvious that lawyers’ relationships with clients or other counsel would add
any quantifiable value to the handling of a matter. Indeed, familiarity might
just as easily destroy value if it causes lawyers to take a client relationship
for granted, makes a law firm difficult to fire because of interpersonal
concerns, or interferes with counsel’s ability to make objective judgments
about the client’s issues.
This Article reports the initial findings of a research program to study the
working relationships between lawyers and their clients, as well as lawyers
and their opposing counsel, in the transactional setting. The study focuses
on a particular type of transaction—the initial public offering (IPO) of a
company’s stock—and draws upon data from interviews with equity capital
markets practitioners who work on such deals, as well as publicly available
data on deal performance.
The results provide evidence that the quality of the working relationship
between a lawyer and his or her client, as well as relationships between a
lawyer and the counsel on the other side of the transaction, have a
significant impact on deal performance in the context of IPOs. The study
adds to the literature about the nature of lawyers’ relationships with their

1. See, e.g., John C. Coates et al., Hiring Team, Firms and Lawyers: Evidence of the
Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 999, 1028–
30 (2011) (finding that in-house legal counsel rely on relationships and prior experience with
law firms when selecting counsel).
2. For one of the more famous articulations of, and answers to, that question, see
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Producing Information: Initial Public Offerings,
Production Costs, and the Producing Lawyer, 74 OR. L. REV. 275, 285–86 (1995)
(describing a theory of IPO transactions in which lawyers act as one part of a larger
endeavor by bankers, accountants, and other parties to produce information).
4. See Jon R. Katzenbach & Douglas K. Smith, The Discipline of Teams, HARV. BUS.
REV., Mar.–Apr. 1993, at 111, 112 (describing team outputs as “a collective work-product
reflect[ing] the joint, real contribution of team members”).
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clients5 and provides quantitative evidence of the benefits that a good
working relationship can yield in a transactional setting.
To provide this evidence, I analyze the impact of repeated collaborations
between managing underwriters and the various legal counsel they employ
in the IPO process, as a proxy of better working relationships. I also
analyze the impact of repeated interactions between different sets of
counsel on IPO transactions within a relatively short period. I find a strong
association between the number of times a particular law firm and bank
work together within the preceding one, two, and three years and better deal
outcomes, as gauged by a stock’s opening day returns and price
performance over thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, as well as the time
to completion of each deal. The impact on stock performance decreases the
further back in time successive lawyer-client interactions go. To rule out
selection, I perform an analysis using smaller samples of only the most
prestigious and experienced banks and perform other tests on subsets of the
data that exclude observations that could plausibly be the product of
selection. I also show that frequent interaction between lawyers and their
clients is associated with deals that are more accurately priced (as indicated
by an increasing probability of correct upward price revision for each prior
representation) and completed more quickly (as indicated by increasingly
faster deal completion from the filing date of the preliminary prospectus for
each prior representation). In addition, I show that relational effects as
proxied by repeated interactions impact deal outcomes independently of the
experience of the lawyers involved.
These findings provide evidence that lawyers’ familiarity and relational
skill can positively influence deal outcomes, independent even of their level
of experience with regard to substantive legal expertise. I hypothesize that
the core advantage of repeated interaction is the generation of trust and
familiarity, leading to more effective lawyer-client team dynamics. That
explanation is consistent with research on teams indicating that repeated
interaction among team members fosters lower error rates and better team
outputs,6 as well as the accounts of practicing lawyers gleaned from
interviews. The basic conclusion to which the literature points is that
frequent collaboration is a product of frequent interaction, and groups who
collaborate form better teams. Better teamwork in turn produces overall
better performance in the negotiation of capital markets transactions,
leading to better information product, more efficient allocation of marketing
5. See, e.g., Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1000 (reporting the results of a survey
of corporate in-house counsel finding that large companies keep a stable of preferred law
firms to provide services; that relationships are important to selection of counsel; and that
clients focus on teams and departments, as well as entire firms and individuals, in choosing
firms); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals? Toward a New Model of the Corporate AttorneyClient Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2067, 2070 (2010) (arguing that the relationship
between corporate counsel and corporate clients resembles a strategic alliance or partnership
more than an agency relationship).
6. See J. Richard Hackman, Why Teams Don’t Work, in THEORY AND RESEARCH ON
SMALL GROUPS 245, 250 (R. Scott Tindale et al. eds., 1998) (discussing research on teams
indicating that repeated team interactions lead to lower rates of error, among other things).
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efforts, and ultimately better stock performance. The broader implication
of this conclusion is that the model of lawyer-client relationship in
transactions should incorporate a consideration of the team dynamics
involved as well as more traditional principal and agent roles.
This research brings a previously unexplored perspective to the study of
securities law and transactional lawyering. To date, despite a large body of
research on IPO transactions7 and the role of lawyers in deal making,8 no
studies have sought to investigate the impact of collaboration on IPO deals.
Scholarship in the past several decades has supported the idea that
cooperation among lawyers would be beneficial to both clients and society
as a whole, and much research has focused on finding ways to foster it in
the legal profession.9 However, these studies have not focused on the
quality of working relationships between the various parties involved in a
group production process like an IPO.10
Because my goal is to explore individuals’ interactions, and by extension
the familiarity among the lawyers and bankers conducting deals, I limit the
time frames to the one year, two years, and three years preceding each deal.
I gather data from interviews with professionals in law firms, investment
banks, and institutional investment firms to understand their perceptions of
the impact of familiarity and to supplement the statistical analysis by
unpacking the causal mechanisms and meanings that the numbers do not
reveal. I examine a number of outcome-related variables for which data is
available, including price performance, informational completeness
(evidenced by disclosure), probability of securities litigation, length of time
from the initiation of the deal to the offering date, and decimal versus
7. See, e.g., B. Espen Eckbo et al., Security Offerings, in HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE
FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 275–355 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007) (reviewing
the voluminous empirical finance literature on IPOs).
8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers As Transaction Cost Engineers, in THE NEW
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 508–14 (Peter Newman ed., 1998);
Gilson, supra note 2, at 240–44; Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Foreword:
Business Lawyers and Value Creation for Clients, 74 OR. L. REV. 1, 2–6 (1995)
9. See, e.g., Rachel Croson & Robert H. Mnookin, Does Disputing Through Agents
Enhance Cooperation? Experimental Evidence, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 331–33 (1997)
(examining experimentally the impact of lawyer reputational concerns in improving
cooperation); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 509, 550
(1994); see also James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in
Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431, 431–35 (2002) (discussing the
professionalization of collaborative lawyering approaches). The type of cooperation that
these studies deal with is distinct from teamwork, as it is used in this Article. Cooperation,
as used in other research, refers to the lawyers on opposite sides of litigation revealing
information and working to come to a swift resolution for their clients. See Gilson &
Mnookin, supra, at 550. Teamwork includes cooperation but goes beyond it, encompassing
the working relationships between all parties, including the lawyers, clients, and other
outside experts, largely subsuming adversarialism in pursuit of a common goal.
10. Cf. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779 (1972) (defining team production as
“production in which 1) several types of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum
of separable outputs of each cooperating resource . . . [and] 3) not all resources used in team
production belong to one person”).
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integer pricing (an indicator of a well negotiated final price). I control for a
number of other factors that affect performance commonly employed in the
literature on IPOs. Appendix Figure A sets out the variables analyzed and
standard controls used.
The results are generally illustrated by Figure 1 below, showing the
relationship present in the raw data between the IPO stock’s performance
on the first day of trading (the first day “bounce” if the change is positive)
and the number of times in the preceding year an underwriter has
collaborated with its counsel, as well as the number of times the two sets of
law firms involved in the deal have encountered each other working on an
IPO. As Figure 1 shows, repeated interactions bear a linear relationship to
an incrementally increasing opening day bounce. The pattern remains in
regression analyses controlling for factors that may also influence the first
day bounce, as detailed below.
The trend in first day bounce has mixed implications but is generally a
positive result for the underwriter and its counsel. A large first day price
increase indicates that the stock was priced at a level lower than what the
market would bear, at least in the short term. Because underwriters are
typically compensated by commission (usually around 7 percent) on the
gross proceeds of the offering at its initial price, the large first day bounce
appears at first blush to represent money that the underwriter leaves on the
table.11 However, underpriced IPOs are a ubiquitous phenomenon, and it is
widely believed that a moderate first day bounce indicates a successful
transaction.12 This is because a healthy first day bounce purportedly
generates publicity for the offering, attracts investor interest, and allays the
For these reasons,
possibility of an undersubscribed offering.13
underwriters are reported to underprice IPOs intentionally by approximately
10 to 15 percent of the stock’s expected market value once it is fully
distributed.14
11. See Sean J. Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of
the Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583,
590–99 (2004).
12. See generally Randolph P. Beatty & Jay R. Ritter, Investment Banking, Reputation,
and the Underpricing of Initial Public Offerings, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 213 (1986); Tim Loughran
& Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2004,
at 5, 5–37; Jay R. Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review of IPO Activity, Pricing, and Allocations,
57 J. FIN. 1795 (2002). See also Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance Theory of
Why Initial Public Offerings Are Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. 17, 18–22 (1993)
(describing underpricing and critiquing litigation avoidance theories for it); James C.
Spindler, IPO Underpricing, Disclosure, and Litigation Risk (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch. Law &
Econ., Working Paper No. 94, 2009), http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1105&context=usclwps-lewps
(analyzing
explanations
of
underpricing)
[http://perma.cc/BDM5-3U8D].
For a review of the finance literature discussing
underpricing, see generally Alexander Ljungqvist, IPO Underpricing, in HANDBOOK OF
CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 375–422 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2007)
(reviewing the literature on underpricing).
13. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 599–618 (explaining the potential benefits for
underwriters and issuers of a significant first day price increase).
14. Underwriters frequently attempt to attain a certain level of underpricing
intentionally, typically around 15 percent of the stock’s expected equilibrium trading price.
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Figure 1: Repeated Counsel Interactions and First Day Bounce

Moreover, even though a high first day bounce—indicating high levels of
underpricing—represents a significant loss of money to the underwriter
because it results in lower commissions, underwriters have been able to
garner significant value from underpriced offerings through trading
commissions and future services from preferred clients, who profit from
buying into the underpriced offerings.15 Therefore, whether the result

The purpose of the underpricing is reported to be ensuring strong demand and mitigating the
impact of hedge funds and other investors “flipping” the stock in the market. For example,
sealed documents from the eToys litigation made public in early 2013 feature a Goldman
Sachs pitchbook stating that an IPO should be priced at a “10–15% discount to the expected
fully distributed trading level [which is its] anticipated ‘seasoned’ trading value 1–3 months
after the offering.” Joe Nocera, eToys vs. Goldman Sachs: The Documents, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/03/10/opinion/sunday/noceragoldman-sachs-etoys.html (publishing sealed documents from the case eToys Inc. ex rel.
Post Effective Date Committee v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 02/601805 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2002)) [http://perma.cc/5M3X-V8HP].
15. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810 (explaining underpricing as a form of
compensation to investors for past business and inducement for future business: “If
underwriters are given discretion in share allocations, the discretion will not automatically
be used in the best interests of the issuing firm. Underwriters might intentionally leave more
money on the table then [sic] necessary, and then allocate these shares to favored buy-side
clients. There is some evidence that underpriced share allocations have been used by
underwriters to enrich buy-side clients in return for quid pro quos . . . to curry favor with the
executives of other prospective IPO issuers in a practice known as “spinning” . . . or even to
influence politicians” (citations omitted)); see also Nocera, supra note 14 (disclosing
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shown in Figure 1 represents excessive underpricing or not, it indicates an
increasingly positive deal outcome for the underwriter.
This relationship between first day price performance and repeated
interaction, as well as other results, is further elaborated below. All
specifications in the empirical model include controls for each industry,
each year, and other confounds, and all of the results are significant at the
10 percent level, with the majority significant at the 5 percent level using
robust standard errors clustered by industry, year, and lead underwriter. It
should be noted that the quantitative and qualitative empirical methods used
in this Article each have their limits, as will be further discussed.
Nonetheless, the results survive numerous tests for robustness as well as
tests to rule out selection. Moreover, the results are consistent with existing
theory, other empirical literature, and practitioner understanding of IPO
deals, such that they provide strong support for this Article’s conclusions.
Part I of this Article describes the IPO process, generally, and the roles of
the relevant parties, in particular the lawyers. This part also reviews the
literature relevant to counsels’ role in IPO transactions and develops
testable hypotheses about the impact of repeated interactions. Part II
describes the data and methodology of this study and discusses the
statistical results of the hypothesis testing. Part III explains the assumptions
employed in the study and the limitations of the methodology. Part III also
discusses the normative and policy implications of the results.
I. IPO PRICING AND THE LAWYERS’ ROLE
IN TRANSACTION MANAGEMENT
Before delving into the analysis of lawyer-client interactions, it is useful
to discuss the prevailing theory about how lawyers add value in transactions
and what specific features of a lawyer’s work in IPOs align with that
theory. One of the first actions taken by both underwriters and issuing
companies about to go public is to appoint legal counsel to assist in the
process.16 The lawyers are essential to the transaction from the very
beginning.17 Lawyers can influence the outcome of a capital markets
transaction in any number of ways, but the most obvious mechanisms at

documents indicating that the underwriter profited through various kinds of reciprocal
investor paybacks). As one commentator has illustrated:
eToys opened at $78 per share, which meant that Goldman’s clients were sitting
on a profit of $475 million the minute that the stock started trading on the open
market. In most cases, the clients cashed out—which was smart, because eToys
didn’t stay at those levels for long. But if Goldman got back 40% of those profits
in trading commissions, then it made $190 million in commissions, compared to
that $11.5 million in fees.
Felix Salmon, Where Banks Really Make Money on IPOs, REUTERS (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/03/11/where-banks-really-make-money-on-ipos/
[http://perma.cc/SP8V-9MN2].
16. Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public: Practice, Procedure and Consequences, 27
VILL. L. REV. 1, 6–7 (1981) (discussing the importance of the issuing company’s advisors,
including its counsel, when beginning an IPO).
17. See id.
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work in IPOs are the lawyer’s ability to influence the information available
to the market via disclosure and the lawyer’s ability to reduce transaction
costs. These mechanisms were famously articulated in Professor Ronald
Gilson’s description of the lawyer as “transaction cost engineer.”18 The
“transaction cost engineer” description starts by accepting the validity of
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), which provides a theoretical
basis for calculating the expected return on a given asset, given the asset’s
risk characteristics.19 The “transaction cost engineer” explanation of
lawyering posits that lawyers contribute to better deals through services that
cause financial products or transactions to conform to the assumptions
underlying the CAPM.20 In the context of financial instruments, one way
that lawyers do this is by helping to create products whose risk and return
profiles are conveyed accurately and comprehensibly to participants in the
markets, such that the market can efficiently value such products. In the
following sections, I describe the tasks that lawyers perform in IPOs that fit
the “transaction cost engineer” description, and I explain how these tasks
are the product of collaboration with clients as well as other sets of lawyers,
as opposed to individual efforts by any particular set of counsel.
A. Lawyers and Information Production in IPOs
An IPO is a company’s introduction to the public markets, and therefore
gathering and disseminating information about the issuing company and its
prospects is one of the most important components of the transaction. It
follows that one means by which lawyers can influence the performance of
an IPO is through their central role producing information about the issuing
company.
1. The Role of Lawyers and Their Clients in Producing Information
From the outset of the IPO process, the lawyers for the underwriters and
the lawyers for the issuing company will play an important role in creating
the information product that will be used to price and market the issuing

18. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 255 (arguing that lawyers add value in transactions by
“devising efficient mechanisms which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory’s
hypothetical world of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting
transactions in this world”); see also Gilson, supra note 8, at 508–14; Gilson & Mnookin,
supra note 8, at 2–4.
19. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Capital Asset Pricing Model:
Theory and Evidence, 18 J. ECON. PERSPS., Summer 2004, at 25, 25–30 (describing the
capital asset pricing model and research on its validity). The model provides a means of
estimating the non-diversifiable risk of an asset—the risk that cannot be offset by including
the asset in a diversified portfolio. The risk corresponds to the return an investor should
expect on the asset to compensate for that risk. Id.; see also Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 561–62 n.41 (1984);
Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years
Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 718 (2003).
20. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 254.
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company’s stock.21 This task will first involve a due diligence review, in
which the lawyers and the underwriter thoroughly investigate the issuing
company’s business.22 During the due diligence review, the attorneys will
gather and verify information for the prospectus, which in turn helps to
manage liability risk from material omissions and misstatements.23 Typical
legal due diligence often includes a review of material contracts, related
party transactions, cross default provisions, negative pledge agreements,
and rights of third parties to terminate contracts.24 Due diligence requires
involvement of the issuing company, which gathers the relevant
information for the lawyers to review. It also necessarily involves the
underwriters, who may raise questions or ask for verification on particular
matters during the process.25
While due diligence progresses, the lawyers for both the issuer and the
underwriters are heavily involved in drafting the prospectus, which is the
main document through which the newly issued securities will be
marketed.26 The prospectus is usually drafted iteratively in meetings
involving both sets of counsel and their clients and through a series of
exchanged drafts.27 Counsel for the issuer typically takes the lead in
drafting the prospectus and thus has a large amount of control over the
draft,28 but the underwriter’s counsel has significant impact as well.29 The
issuing company’s management, as well as representatives from the
underwriter, provides input throughout the process, as each has a direct
interest in how the document is drafted.30 The underwriter can often play a
significant role by providing precedent documents at the outset of the
transaction, thus setting the template from which the deal documentation
draws.31
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations specify the
information that must be disclosed32 and also require that the prospectus

21. See Utset, supra note 3, at 277 (describing the lawyers’ job in an IPO to be the
production of an information bundle).
22. See Royce de Rohan Barondes et al., Underwriters’ Counsel As Gatekeeper or
Turnstile: An Empirical Analysis of Law Firm Prestige and Performance in IPOs, 2 CAP.
MKTS L.J. 164, 167 (2007).
23. See id.; see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 4–5.
24. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 167 (explaining the details of the lawyers’
involvement in the IPO process).
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (“This drafting is an iterative process, as knowledge gained in due diligence
informs what needs to be said about the issuer.”).
28. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14–15 (“The ‘quarterback’ in preparing the
registration statement is normally the attorney for the company. Company counsel is
principally responsible for preparing the non-financial parts of the registration statement.”).
29. See id. at 16 (“Close cooperation is required among counsel for the company, the
underwriters’ counsel, the accountants, and the printer.”).
30. See id. at 14, 18.
31. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014) (name withheld by request)
(on file with author).
32. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10–229.915 (2014). Required disclosure includes:
(1) information about the company’s business, see id. §§ 229.101–229.103; (2) the
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disclosure not be misleading.33 Moreover, the prospectus must not contain
any material misstatements or omissions,34 with “material” defined as
“matters to which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor
would attach importance in determining whether to purchase the security
registered.”35 Applying the materiality standard requires legal analysis and
judgment, and lawyers play a significant role deciding what is necessary to
disclose.36 Nonetheless, the prospectus is a marketing document as well as
a regulatory one, and the underwriter typically has requirements of its own
that make the prospectus a more effective tool for marketing purposes.37
Additionally, the issuing company usually takes a strong interest in how its
story is told.38 Thus, the drafting process requires collaboration between all
the parties and requires counsel to work closely with each other and with
both sets of clients.
The due diligence process continues throughout the drafting of the
prospectus, and can continue even after the filing of a preliminary version
prospectus with the SEC.39 The SEC’s review of the preliminary
prospectus typically involves several rounds of comments and requests for
clarifications, additions, or alterations to the disclosure, each of which must
be addressed.40 During the time that the SEC is reviewing the preliminary
prospectus, the underwriter and issuer’s management engage in marketing
efforts.41 The lead underwriter and issuer’s management market the stock
by visiting institutional investors in various cities and presenting the
company’s story as set out in the preliminary prospectus.42 Through this
process (known as a “road show” or “dog and pony show”), the underwriter

management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition of the company, including
future projections if desired, see id. § 229.303; (3) financial statements and an auditor’s
opinion covering them, see id. § 210; (4) a description of material contracts, see id. §§
229.10–229.915; (5) information about legal and regulatory problems facing the company,
see id. § 229.103; (6) information about the officers and directors of the company and their
compensation, see id. §§ 229.403–405; and (7) certain industry specific information, see
generally SEC, INDUSTRY GUIDES, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/industryguides.pdf
[http://perma.cc/XY8S-G6L2].
33. See § 230.408.
34. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); Exchange Act of
1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
35. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405.
36. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (reviewing the process by which lawyers
negotiate and draft the prospectus disclosure and concluding that it is a
“process . . . involving the exercise of judgment”).
37. See id.; Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14.
38. Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14, 18.
39. Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, Strategic Disclosure and the Pricing of
Initial Public Offerings 2 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://server1.tepper.
cmu.edu/Seminars/docs/hanley_hoberg_March.pdf [http://perma.cc/VXA7-MDKY].
40. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 45–50 (discussing the SEC comment and
review process); see also William W. Barker, SEC Registration of Public Offerings Under
the Securities Act of 1933, 52 BUS. LAW. 65, 70–72 (1996) (describing the SEC staff’s role
in the registration and disclosure process).
41. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 22 (noting that the “red herrings” are
distributed after filing and while the SEC reviews the filing).
42. See id.
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assesses the demand for the stock by building a book of indicative orders
from interested investors.43 Because the Securities Act prohibits public
offers or sales of the stock before the prospectus is finalized and approved,
investor orders cannot yet be binding.44 Moreover, information given to the
investors during the road show must conform to what is contained in the
preliminary prospectus.45
When the marketing effort is complete, the lead underwriter negotiates
with the issuing company’s management to set a final price for the stock
based largely on the investor demand ascertained during the road show.46
Once the final price is negotiated, a final version of the prospectus and final
pricing information are deemed effective by the SEC.47 The shares are then
sold to the investors at the final price, and the company goes public.48
Throughout this process, the lawyers for both the issuer and the
underwriter play a key role verifying and synthesizing historical
information and producing new information that may be needed by offering
a legal interpretation of key issues in the deal.49 In addition, counsel are
often responsible for helping to produce accurate information about

43. See id. at 22–23; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES
REGULATION 115, 122–25 (11th ed. 2009) (describing the road show and bookbuilding
process); Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168–69 (describing the development of an
offering price and using the initial filing range as a proxy for the estimate developed during
the “beauty contest”).
44. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(e) (2012); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 114
(“Sales are . . . still barred . . . and the underwriter also cannot accept customers’ oral offers
to buy. But the underwriters can ‘build their book,’ collecting non-binding indications of
interest from customers, which they hope to convert into sales once the registration
statement is declared effective.”).
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (prohibiting material misstatements and omissions in
connection with the sale or offer of securities); id. § 77l(a)(2) (civil liability for documents
containing materially false or misleading information); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note
43, at 123–25 (discussing disclosures to investors during road show presentations).
46. See Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 168 (“In a customary IPO, there is not a
definitive agreement on the price at which the underwriters will resell the stock to the public
until after the preliminary marketing process is complete, some time after a preliminary
prospectus has been circulated. SEC rules, however, require that a preliminary prospectus
for an IPO circulated prior to the pricing include a bona fide estimate of the price, frequently
stated as a range, at which the stock will be sold. This price estimate may change in
subsequent preliminary prospectuses, as the managing underwriter acquires information
during the marketing process.”).
47. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.424(b), 230.430A (2014); see also COFFEE & SALE, supra note
43, at 128–29. Before the promulgation of Rule 430A, the underwriters were required to file
pricing information in the form of an amendment to the registration statement before the
SEC declared the registration statement effective. See id. Under Rule 430A, the registration
statement can be declared effective before the filing of pricing-related information as long as
a complete final prospectus is filed shortly thereafter. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.430A.
48. See COFFEE & SALE, supra note 43, at 129.
49. For example, counsel typically give formal legal opinions regarding the issuer and
the stock being issued, as well as interpret legal matters such as tax and litigation
consequences. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18 (“In addition, company counsel
normally renders a formal opinion on the legality of the securities being registered, which is
filed as an exhibit to the registration statement. In connection with a common stock
offering, the opinion would state that the shares being offered are legally issued, fully paid,
and non-assessable.”).
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possible future performance by working with the accountants to ensure that
earnings projections and discussions of planned activities are appropriately
balanced and match the financial statements in the prospectus.50 Counsel
also play a key role in determining how the information will be presented,
which in turn influences how clearly the information is conveyed to
investors and analysts.51 All of these activities require significant input
from clients and therefore benefit from good working relationships between
counsel and clients, as well as a good understanding by counsel of what
clients’ interests are in each stage of the process. The ultimate product has
an impact on the performance of the deal, as discussed in the next section.
2. The Role of Information in Transactional Outcomes
In theory, the information product that lawyers work with their clients to
produce impacts the extent to which investors can accurately assess the risk
and return profiles of issuing companies, and therefore should impact the
performance of a company’s stock, at least in the short- and medium-term.
The theoretical impact of disclosure on price is supported by empirical
work that has studied the connection between the two.52
Empirical studies have generally found a connection between rough
measures of disclosure quality and the market’s reception of an IPO stock.53
Disclosure quality has been proxied in these studies in terms of volume,54
proportion of the prospectus,55 and level of ambiguity.56 These studies
indicate that certain types of disclosure bear significant relationships to
price performance of the issued securities in the market. The studies
indicate that risk factor disclosure—described as a negative or ambiguous
disclosure—bears a positive association with underpricing.57 In other
words, risk factor disclosure is related to a large price increase of the stock
on the first day of trading, which means that the offering price was lower
than the market uptake of the stock would have predicted, at least in the
short-term. By contrast, greater levels of neutral or positive disclosure (i.e.,

50. See id.
51. See id. at 18–19.
52. See, e.g., Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer
Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA. L. REV. 1335, 1369–93 (1999) (surveying
available empirical studies on the impact of mandatory disclosure).
53. See, e.g., Tom Arnold et al., The Effects of Ambiguous Information on Initial and
Subsequent IPO Returns, 39 FIN. MGMT. 1497, 1497–1500 (2010) [hereinafter Arnold et al.,
Effects of Ambiguous Information]; Kathleen Weiss Hanley & Gerard Hoberg, The
Information Content of IPO Prospectuses, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 2821, 2821–23 (2010);
Spindler, supra note 12, at 1–5; Tom Arnold et al., Measuring Risk Disclosure in IPOs and
Its Effect on Initial and Subsequent Returns (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript),
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/228419565_Measuring_Risk_Disclosure_in_IPOs_
and_its_Effect_on_Initial_and_Subsequent_Returns [http://perma.cc/7LTY-WSN2].
54. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9.
55. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–40; see also Spindler, supra note 12,
at 9–10 (using ratio of risk factors to prospectus summary as a proxy for overall proportion
of positive to negative disclosure).
56. Arnold et al., Effects of Ambiguous Information, supra note 53, at 1497.
57. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9–19.
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everything outside of the risk factors) have been found to correspond to less
underpricing.58 More particularly, certain sections of the prospectus
containing important information, specifically the Management Discussion
and Analysis (MD&A), the Prospectus Summary, and Use of Proceeds
sections, have been found to correspond to lower levels of underpricing.59
Taken together, these studies indicate that positive information leads to
more accurate pricing, while ambiguous or negative information leads to
less accurate pricing and more money left on the table by the issuing
company.60 This also results in lower commissions for the underwriter, but
as explained below, the underwriter may garner benefits from this
phenomenon that more than offset any loss. These studies are relevant to
the lawyers’ role in the transaction and in the securities law scheme more
generally, because both sets of lawyers provide substantial input into the
disclosure. The lawyers produce information for the prospectus and verify
its content through due diligence, make legal judgments about the extent of
information necessary to include in the prospectus, review the prospectus
for accuracy, and negotiate its content with each other and with the SEC via
rounds of comment and response. Therefore, to the extent disclosure has an
impact on material outcomes of the deal, such as price accuracy and
stability over time, the lawyers’ role in creating the prospectus is
significant.
B. Lawyers and Transaction Costs in IPOs
Transaction cost engineering involves minimizing transaction costs that
unnecessarily reduce the value of a financial product, while bearing no
inherent relationship to the financial product’s expected risk or return.61
Transaction costs create inefficiencies in the deal making process, causing
it to become more difficult or costly than it would be if conducted in a
hypothetical perfect market.62 These costs can arise from numerous
sources: time, expense, regulatory costs, bargaining costs, enforcement
costs, inefficient communication, irrational or strategic behavior, and
externalities.63 Lack of information, risk, and uncertainty also create
transaction costs. With respect to transaction costs, risk, uncertainty, and
lack of information affect a transaction because they impose costs to

58. See id. at 16–19.
59. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34. I have located no study that has
been able to confirm a causal relationship between disclosure and underpricing, and several
have noted that it may be the result of underlying uncertainty. As explained below, this
Article provides previously unavailable evidence of causation through instrumental variable
regression.
60. See id. at 2857–61.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 21–28
(1995) (describing how transaction costs affect firm size and choices); Oliver E. Williamson,
The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach, 87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 553–
56 (1981) (discussing different types of transaction costs and their effects on asset
allocation).
63. See generally HART, supra note 62; Williamson, supra note 62.
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overcome them, disable complete contracting or, as often happens, create
obstacles that can cause a deal to break down even when it should make
economic sense.64
Lawyers can minimize transaction costs in a number of ways in addition
to producing accurate information as described in the preceding section,
and good working relationships with clients are important to all of them.
Lawyers may reduce costly inefficiencies by helping parties avoid and
resolve potentially costly disputes that could needlessly prevent valuable
deal making.65 Lawyers can contribute to reducing transaction costs by
helping coordinate the different parties involved and ensuring that all
parties have a proper understanding of the tasks to be completed at each
stage of the deal.66 Expertise with respect to the IPO process is important
for accomplishing this end, but relational skill is perhaps more important
because it facilitates efficient interactions between the parties.67 This can,
in turn, facilitate faster deal completion and establish processes that require
less work on the part of clients, who can then focus their energies on other
aspects of the deal. Greater time efficiency can reduce unwanted deal
delays and allow the underwriter better to control the timing of the deal to
ensure the best performance.
Familiarity of the underwriter’s counsel with the underwriter—both
through relationships with the underwriter’s personnel and through
knowledge of its institutional practices—might also reduce agency costs.
Although agency costs are a distinct concept from transaction costs, agency
costs—stemming from the divergence between information and interests of
the principal and the agent—can lead to inefficiencies that can be
categorized as a form of transaction cost as well. The better a lawyer
knows his or her client’s preferences, the less time and energy are needed
for the client to transfer information to the agent, and the lower the
likelihood that the lawyer will erroneously represent the client’s interest.
The more familiar the lawyer and the client become, the more trust they
develop, and the less effort the client has to put forth to monitor the lawyer.
Moreover, the more familiar a lawyer is with the underwriters’ ideal

64. See generally BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive
Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978) (explaining how transaction costs lead to
contract incompleteness, which in turn is a barrier to deal completion); Paul Milgrom &
John Roberts, Bargaining Costs, Influence Costs, and the Organization of Economic
Activity, in PERSPECTIVES ON POSITIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 57–89 (James E. Alt & Kenneth
A. Shepsle eds., 1990).
65. See Gilson, supra note 2, at 254; Gilson, supra note 8, at 509. Professors Gilson and
Mnookin expand upon this model by explaining that skilled lawyers help their clients by
negotiating value-creating exchanges, capitalizing on economies of scale and scope, and
managing inherent tensions between value creation and distribution. See Gilson & Mnookin,
supra note 8, at 9–12.
66. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 19 (describing the importance of coordination
between the lawyers and other parties and the importance of having a common
understanding of the deal structure).
67. See id.
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outcomes, the more they would be able to advocate for the underwriters’
interests, with less delay and lower danger of miscommunication.
Finally, a lawyer’s substantive expertise can reduce regulatory costs, a
subset of transaction costs,68 adding value by advising clients on ways to
avoid costly government regulations. This might take the form of avoiding
direct costs, such as when a lawyer advises a client on how to minimize
taxation. Or it might involve less direct, but no less significant costs, such
as when a lawyer advises a client on the most favorable jurisdiction and/or
form in which to incorporate to reduce legal uncertainty, or avoid
litigation.69 In the IPO context, counsel may assist in managing regulatory
costs by advising on the issuer’s legal organization, governance, or capital
structure prior to the commencement of the deal.70 Counsel also liaise with
the SEC and other regulators, and the lawyers’ ability to handle issues that
the regulators bring up can have an impact on the timing and efficiency of
the deal.71
C. Lawyers As Reputational Intermediaries
Another way to describe the value of transactional lawyers is through
their role as reputational intermediaries.72 Reputational intermediaries
convey important information to the market about the quality of a
transaction.73 This model suggests that lawyers (as well as other
professionals involved in the deal) add value by providing a signal of
quality in the underlying transaction.74 This model is not exclusive of the

68. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 500–02 (2006) (reporting the results of a survey in in-house
legal counsel on the value of transactional lawyers).
69. See id.; see also Oren Bar-Gill et al., The Market for Corporate Law (Harvard Law
Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econs. & Bus. Discussion Paper Series, Paper 337, 2002),
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1165&context=harvard_olin (describing the
market for corporate law, as evidenced by choices of jurisdiction of incorporation that most
reduces costs related to legal uncertainty and use of familiar default rules)
[http://perma.cc/7WPT-QT7Q].
70. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19.
71. See id. at 19–20 (discussing the process of dealing with SEC comment and
deficiency letters).
72. See Peter J. Gardner, A Role for the Business Attorney in the Twenty-First Century:
Adding Value to the Client’s Enterprise in the Knowledge Economy, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP.
L. REV. 17, 46–48 (2003); see also Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers,
74 OR. L. REV. 15, 44–45 (1995) (proposing alternatives to lawyers as reputational
intermediaries). The impact of lawyer expertise has been examined in the mergers and
acquisitions context. See C.N.V. Krishnan & Ronald W. Masulis, Law Firm Expertise and
Mergers and Acquisitions, 56 J.L. & ECON. 189, 189–99 (2013).
73. See generally Randolph P. Beatty, Auditor Reputation and the Pricing of Initial
Public Offerings, 64 ACCT. REV. 693 (1989); Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12; Richard Carter
& Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045,
1053 (1990); Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the LongRun Performance of IPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285, 285–290 (1998).
74. See Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial
Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545, 596 (1996); see also Okamato, supra note 72, at 18
(“The suggestion here is that service as a reputational intermediary is a defining aspect of
lawyers’ work.”).
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“transaction costs engineers” model; in fact, a lawyer’s reputation may
itself derive from the ability to reduce transaction costs in the way that
Gilson and others describe. Nonetheless, the reputational intermediary
model encompasses more than the lawyer’s substantive ability to reduce
frictions by applying legal or negotiation skill. The model includes the
possibility that because of reputational concerns, lawyers will screen
transactions before agreeing to take on the work, and therefore the mere
fact of a lawyer’s participation in a deal is a signal of quality.75
In the context of IPOs specifically, theories have been advanced that the
reputation of the underwriter,76 auditor,77 and underwriter’s counsel78
might all convey information to investors beyond what is contained in the
prospectus and affect the price of the IPO stock. Empirical tests of these
theories have demonstrated a relationship between lead underwriter
reputation and lower levels of underpricing, indicating more accurate
pricing of the offering.79 This has been explained as a function of the
incentives of high reputation underwriters in preserving their reputations
through more accurate pricing.
A similar relationship has been
demonstrated with regard to auditors.80 However, studies of lawyers’
reputations have had mixed results: one study found a negative relationship
between market share of legal counsel and IPO underpricing generally,
although the trend reversed with respect to large New York law firms.81
Other studies have found that lawyers’ reputations, when measured by
market share, do not impact price.82 This makes sense to the extent that the
identity of the lawyers rarely plays a role in investors’ decision making.83
However, as explained further in subsequent sections, the reputation of
legal counsel alone is unlikely to play a large role in the performance of
IPO deals.
D. Repeated Interaction and Selection of Counsel
Apart from lawyer reputation, lawyers’ ability to add value in the ways
just described might all be affected by their familiarity with the clients
whom they represent. Even reputation, though not directly impacted by
75. See id.
76. See e.g., Beatty & Ritter, supra note 12, at 213; Carter et al., supra note 73, at 285.
77. See, e.g., Beatty, supra note 73, at 693.
78. See, e.g., Barondes et al., supra note 22, at 166.
79. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2853–55. But see Patch Paczkowski &
Majdi Anwar Quttainah, Law Firm Prestige As a Signal of Value for Initial Public Offerings
(June 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2087695
[http://perma.cc/T2QJ-SQ6Y]. For further discussion of this theory, see generally Franklin
Allen & Gerald R. Faulhaber, Signaling by Underpricing in the IPO Market, 23 J. FIN.
ECON. 303 (1989).
80. See generally Beatty, supra note 73.
81. See Royce de R. Barondes & Gary C. Sanger, Lawyer Experience and IPO Pricing
16–21 (May 4, 2000) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=227729 [http://perma.cc/6PF2-XNP8].
82. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 575–95.
83. Telephone Interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
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familiarity with clients, might be related to lawyers’ ability to cultivate and
maintain client relationships. One way to assess whether good working
relationships have any impact on deals is to look at the repeated interactions
between lawyers and clients. Repeated interactions provide a useful proxy
for better lawyer-client relationships because they build familiarity and
trust, establish common understanding, and facilitate communication.84
As previously noted, my research has not revealed other studies of the
impact of lawyers’ relational skill in the transactional setting. However,
empirical studies of lawyer relationships in other contexts shed some light
on what results might be expected, and a number of instructive studies have
looked at lawyers as repeat players. One noteworthy study demonstrated
that iterative relations significantly promote collaboration between lawyers
on opposite sides of a case in the litigation context.85 Another empirical
study tested repeated interactions among litigators and concluded that
frequent contact helps lawyers to learn about each other’s strategies, build
relationships, and foster concern for reputation.86 The study concluded that
repeated interactions increase cooperation between lawyers negotiating a
settlement, as the different sides learn how best to deal with each other.87 It
is possible that the dynamics at work for repeated meetings among litigators
would hold true for repeated meetings between lawyers and clients in the
transactional setting as well.
The empirical literature on teams adds support to the hypothesis that
repeated interaction fosters trust and better teamwork. A number of studies
provide evidence that frequent interaction leads to the creation of group
norms, shared understanding of the tasks to be completed, and routinized
processes.88 These processes further allow each member of the team to
leverage individual expertise more effectively and in concert with other
team members. Experimental evidence suggests that when team members
are replaced by newer members of a team, some of these gains are lost as
the team and the new member adjust to a new group dynamic.89 This

84. See Steve W. J. Kozlowski & Daniel R. Ilgen, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Work
Groups and Teams, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 77, 81 (2006).
85. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 534–64 (discussing the impact of iterative
interactions on litigators); see also Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 340–45.
86. Jason Scott Johnston & Joel Waldfogel, Does Repeat Play Elicit Cooperation?
Evidence from Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 46, 59–60 (2002).
87. See id. at 40–48 (outlining mechanisms by which better results are obtained through
repeated interactions); see also Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–50 (stating gametheoretic bases for increased cooperation over time).
88. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“[R]epeated interactions among
individuals that constitute processes tend to regularize, such that shared
structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent process interactions. Process
begets structure, which in turn guides process.”); see also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at
17–19 (discussing the need for deal team members to have a common understanding of the
tasks to be accomplished).
89. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 86. In one interesting experiment, teams
were assembled to create origami birds. Teams gained efficiency from repeating the task
together multiple times, but lost efficiency when members of the existing team were
replaced with new members. See id.
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further suggests that frequent collaboration engenders benefits to a group
endeavor that cannot be easily replicated in the absence of such familiarity.
Empirical studies of the relationships between lawyers and their clients
suggest that clients value familiarity.90 Large corporate clients such as
investment banks frequently choose from among a panel of lawyers, all of
whom are of high quality.91 But recent empirical work indicates that
selection of counsel is based on more than quality of counsel and fee
structure as traditionally assumed; relationships with lawyers and teams of
lawyers within each firm exert a strong influence on which law firms are
selected to act for a client.92 Similarly, lawyers in the equity capital
markets space emphasize the importance of interpersonal relationships with
clients as a major factor that helps them to get repeat business.93 Thus,
there are indications that familiarity and relationships are valuable to clients
as well as lawyers.
Nonetheless, familiarity and repeated interaction might not necessarily
lead to measurably better outcomes. First, even if there are intangible
benefits from familiarity, they may not translate into any quantifiable
results in terms of deal performance. The various individuals who are party
to the deal might enjoy the experience more, and feel it is more efficient,
but this may or may not translate into, for example, better disclosure, better
marketing, or better price performance. Second, familiarity does not
necessarily lead to better quality of interaction in every instance. Some
research suggests that working together repeatedly may not lead to better
collaboration if team processes are not well thought out.94 Moreover, it is
not difficult to imagine that familiarity might make counsel less able to be
objective, either for fear of offending the client or from loss of perspective
after spending too much time taking the client’s point of view.
Alternatively, familiarity might cause lawyers to take the relationship for
granted and therefore devote fewer resources to the client. In the same
vein, interpersonal considerations or overreliance might make it difficult for
a client to fire its counsel, thus allowing counsel to shirk. I turn now to a
discussion of the data to explain which way it cuts.

90. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1003.
91. See id.
92. See id. But see Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human
Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split
Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313, 357–68 (1985) (advancing a model of lawyer selection based
on relationship to a firm and firm-specific capital rather than interpersonal relationships
among individuals).
93. Some banks have preferred firms. For example, Morgan Stanley is known to work
with Davis Polk & Wardell regularly on equity capital markets deals. Similarly, Goldman
Sachs is known to work frequently with Sullivan & Cromwell. Several of the lawyers in
these firms have such close relationships with bank personnel that they participate in
business related decisions, and their capital markets partners become involved in the
marketing side of IPOs. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name
withheld by request) (on file with author).
94. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50.
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II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The empirical analysis and its implications are set out below. This part
begins by describing the qualitative and quantitative data in detail and
walks through the quantitative analysis. The part discusses how the
quantitative data can be interpreted and how the findings illuminate (or fail
to illuminate) the questions raised in the previous part. This part also
discusses some important caveats and potential weaknesses of the analysis
and discusses why the data are informative despite those weaknesses.
A. Repeated Interactions and IPO Deal Outcomes
In this section, I describe the data and empirical analysis that support the
implications of the theoretical discussion above. First, I describe the
impressions of team dynamics taken from interviews with practicing
lawyers. I then explain the quantitative analysis, drawing from an original
dataset of IPOs and examining the repeated interactions between banks and
law firms that handle the transactions.
1. Practitioner Experience and Team Dynamics
Practitioner accounts are useful for understanding how lawyers and their
clients perceive the impact of team dynamics on deals outcomes. The
lawyers interviewed for this study routinely listed familiarity and trust as
key hallmarks of IPO deals that they experience as successful. Often they
cite past experience working with their clients as an important precursor for
familiarity and trust.95 Moreover, better deals result when all the parties
working on the deal seem to have a common vision of how the deal should
be done.96 While there are certain similarities between deals, each
underwriter leading a deal has idiosyncratic institutional priorities, and the
people within the underwriting banks have their own preferences.97
Lawyers frequently report that understanding those preferences from the
outset of the deal helps to facilitate the entire process.98 The lawyers on the
deal come to understand their client organizations’ operations,99 including
the key personnel to contact to accomplish the range of tasks necessary to
move the deal along.100 In addition, lawyers develop an understanding of
the communication norms inside an investment bank,101 as well as the

95. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request)
(on file with author).
96. See Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.
97. See id.
98. There was a consensus among lawyer interviews that this was the case. See, e.g.,
Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on file with
author).
99. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
100. Id.
101. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Oct. 20, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author). As one lawyer in a large capital markets practice described, “It gets easier
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institutional preferences with regard to how to negotiate the deal.102 This
understanding of how the client operates supplements an enhanced
understanding of the client’s institutional interests, as well as the
preferences of individuals in the client organization.103 The result, in
theory, is better coordination of agents with their principals in the
performance of their tasks. In addition, information disparities are less a
source of agency costs because the lawyer-agent has less need to spend time
gathering information about the client’s interests and can negotiate more
forcefully on the client’s behalf.
Further, when lawyers and clients work together frequently, they develop
greater mutual trust, assuming previous deals have gone well. Trust allows
clients to feel less need to monitor their lawyer-agents, freeing the client to
focus on marketing and other commercial aspects of the deal.104 Indeed,
some lawyer-client relationships involve such a high degree of trust and
familiarity that lawyers become involved in helping their clients to think
through business strategy in addition to providing legal advice.105 The
overall impression is that frequent collaboration leads to trust, that each
member of the deal team can focus on his or her job better, and that the
team produces better work, more quickly.
If familiarity creates trust and efficiency, lack of familiarity can create
the opposite. When describing deals that did not go well, lawyers recall
working with other counsel who do not seem to know the norms of how
deals should be done.106 These deals typically involve issuer’s counsel that
either lack experience in IPOs, or resolutely refuse to trust underwriters. In
such situations, there is often a lack of trust and an adversarial attitude
toward the underwriter and its counsel. In such cases, lawyers for issuing
companies reportedly fight over issues that most seasoned participants in
IPO deals would think are unimportant, and when the issuing company’s
management makes unreasonable demands, the issuer’s lawyers refuse to
counsel their clients on commonly accepted industry practices.107

the more times you work together. I know exactly who to e-mail or call if I need something.
Or who to prod if something needs to get done.” Id.
102. Telephone Interview with Attorney 2 (July 24, 2013) (name withheld by request) (on
file with author).
103. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31. For example, one
in-house lawyer taking his company public recounts that during negotiations, the
underwriter’s counsel, who worked frequently with the underwriters on such deals, regularly
expressed confidence about what his client would or would not agree to, without any need to
confer with anyone from the bank’s team. See Interview with Attorney (June 19, 2013)
(name withheld by request) (on file with author).
104. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2013), supra note 99 (recounting that
some partners in some law firms understand their industry so well that they actually are able
to advise on the help with the commercial side of the a capital markets deal).
105. Id.
106. Telephone Interview with Attorney (Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.
107. See id. Experienced attorneys are reportedly better able to counsel issuing company
management against making exaggerated statements or falling out of step with standard
practices. See also Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 14.
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On the client side, personnel in investment banks who work with lawyers
describe poor deals as those in which the lawyers do not seem to know what
they are doing and in which the bankers have to explain every step. The
deals are marked by a lack of trust in the bank’s counsel and the need to
recheck and sometimes redo work that the lawyers have done.108
2. Quantitative Analysis
The basis for the quantitative analysis below is the observation that
lawyers working on IPOs frequently represent the same underwriter and the
same teams within an underwriting bank. Moreover, lawyers representing
underwriters will often meet the same sets of counsel representing issuers
from deal to deal.109 While it is difficult to observe interpersonal
interactions with enough regularity to assess their systematic impacts, a
meaningful proxy of these interactions is the frequency with which an
investment bank managing a deal and the lawyers serving as the bank’s
counsel work together.110 Although I do not observe the individuals inside
the investment banks themselves, it is reasonable to infer that many of the
same individuals would be involved in deals done within a short time frame
if the deals are done out of the same office, in the same location, and within
a particular industry. Accounting for those factors, the membership of the
teams within banks and firms reportedly remains stable over relatively short
periods of time.111
I examine repeated interactions by looking at the number of IPO deals
completed in the preceding one year, two years, and three years involving:
(1) the same underwriter’s counsel and lead underwriter(s) and (2) the same
sets of counsel. In theory, if repeated interaction improves relationships
between a lawyer and his or her client, it might have positive benefits for a
lawyer’s effectiveness, coordination, and communication in furtherance of
the client’s interests. In addition, relationships across the table can help to
facilitate the deal. With respect to uncertainty and risk, better coordination
could help produce more complete and easily digested disclosure, thus
reducing uncertainty in the market and allowing investors to confidently
calculate risk. Coordination might help in this regard because both sets of
lawyers and the underwriter would have a shared understanding of the type
108. Telephone Interview with Attorney (July 23, 2014), supra note 99.
109. Between 1996 and 2010, the same law firm and lead underwriter(s) worked across
the table from one another multiple times in the same year on 450 occasions, out of 2265
total deals. Between 1996 and 2010, there were also 406 instances in which issuer’s counsel
had acted as underwriter’s counsel for the same underwriter within the previous year. On
206 of those occasions, the issuer’s counsel also had worked across the table from the lead
underwriter more than one time in the past year, out of a total of 2265 deals. Between those
same years, 454 IPO deals featured law firms that had worked across the table from one
another in an IPO deal at least three times within the preceding two years.
110. As an additional robustness check, names of individual attorneys for each deal were
collected and matched to each transaction. The result shows a significant effect, with a
stronger magnitude. These results, as well as others, will be reported in a future study.
111. This was corroborated by interviews. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Attorney
(Feb. 2, 2014), supra note 31.
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of information to unearth in the due diligence process and how best to
present it in the prospectus to tell the appropriate story to the market.112
This would in turn translate into more accurate pricing and better
performance in the market. Stronger market performance, coupled with
better disclosure, should produce less IPO-related litigation, all else being
equal.
B. Analysis of the Data
The following discussion explains the quantitative analysis and result of
this study in detail. The data analyzed below comes from a number of
public sources. The starting point for data collection on IPOs in the United
States is the Kenney-Patton IPO Database.113 This dataset contains
information for 2287 de novo IPOs between 1996 and 2010.114 Each IPO
was cross-checked with the Thompson ONE deal record to confirm the
date, ticker, and issuer name.115 From the Thompson ONE database I also
pull information on the underwriting syndicate, including the names of the
bookrunners or joint bookrunners, managers’ and issuer’s counsel, and the
age of the issuing company. The dealsheet also includes the initial price
range filed with the SEC as well as the stock opening price, which I use to
determine whether the opening price was revised up or down from the
initial range. To find measures of each stock’s performance over time, I
use information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
database.116 In particular, I look at the opening day closing price relative to
the offer price; the price change at thirty, sixty, and ninety days and one
year; and the volatility over thirty, sixty, and ninety days. In addition, from
the SEC’s EDGAR database, I gather the offering prospectuses from each
IPO and cull from these the total word counts, as well as the word counts
for each section of the prospectus including the prospectus summary, the
risk factors, and the management’s discussion and analysis section.117 The
word counts disregard information contained in tables and charts. This
methodology is used in other research on IPOs on the rationale that pure
word counts, while constituting a very rough estimate of the types of
112. See Schneider et al., supra note 16, at 18–19 (discussing the importance of close
coordination among members of the deal team).
113. For more information on the database, see MARTIN KENNEY & DONALD PATTON,
U.C. DAVIS, GUIDE TO THE FIRM DATABASE OF EMERGING GROWTH INITIAL PUBLIC
OFFERINGS (IPOS) FROM 1990 THROUGH 2010 (2013), http://hcd.ucdavis.edu/faculty/
webpages/kenney/misc/Firm_IPO_Database_Guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/PRE8-G25G].
114. The database excludes offerings of capital trusts, securitizations, IPOs of preferred
stock, and spin-offs.
115. THOMPSON ONE DATABASE, http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/toolsapplications/trading-investment-tools/thomson-one-investment-researchtools.html?gclid=CjwKEAiAx4anBRDz6JLYjMDxoQYSJAA4loRmqel_bXT8gpjPqFxMyt
6A9VmdVOXXoM_u9oMbvA_3EhoCJdvw_wcB (last visited Sept. 27, 2015)
[http://perma.cc/VU27-UJ3K].
116. CRSP U.S. STOCK DATABASES, http://www.crsp.com/products/research-products/
crsp-us-stock-databases (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/54TD-Q9CJ].
117. U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last visited
Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/BGN2-LBMJ].
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disclosure included, do not suffer from the potential bias associated with
hand-coded disclosure elements.118 Information on class action litigation
was taken from the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse.119
Twenty-two records were dropped because information could not be
found on the issue in the Thompson ONE database or because the CRSP
database did not contain information on the share price. The resulting
dataset has 2265 IPOs spanning fifteen years. The identities of each IPO’s
managing underwriter or underwriters are taken from this data set. A bank
is considered a managing underwriter if it is either the sole bookrunner or a
joint bookrunner.120
The identities of the underwriter’s counsel and
issuer’s counsel are similarly determined from this data.121
The offer date is used to construct variables of how often a certain
underwriter-counsel and counsel-counsel pair have worked together in the
previous one year, two years, and three years for each new issue. For
example, Goldman Sachs was a manager of Goodman Global’s IPO on
April 5, 2006, and their counsel was Cahill Gordon & Reindel. This was
the third time the pair had worked together in a year, as they had also
worked together on Horizon Lines Inc.’s September 26, 2005 IPO and New
Skies Satellites May 9, 2005 IPO. Prior to that, they had not worked
together since they teamed up for Equinix, Inc.’s August 10, 2000 IPO.
Time periods beyond three years are not examined given the likelihood of
lower rates of overlap between teams working together on transactions after
such long time periods.
With respect to the recurring deal in which the same counsel represents
an underwriter, or in which the same law firms meet on opposite sides of
the deal, I analyze a number of quantifiable deal outcomes: price
performance, the incidence of price correction before offering date, the
incidence of litigation, the length of time to complete a transaction, and the
occurrence of non-integer pricing (as a signal of a more heavily negotiated
price). These performance measures are readily quantifiable and offer

118. See Spindler, supra note 12, at 9 (noting the this method “has the advantage of being
objective, as it does not rely upon subjective evaluations of particular disclosures (such as
coding a line of disclosure as ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and does not require subjective index
weighting”). Word counts for my study were taken for a total of 2258 prospectuses. A
small number (seven) of prospectuses were excluded due to transcription errors in the
database.
119. STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu
(last visited Sept. 27, 2015) [http://perma.cc/XK24-VTNU].
120. The most frequent lead underwriters are Goldman Sachs (217), Merrill Lynch (154),
Morgan Stanley (137), Lehman Brothers (131), and JP Morgan (122). Bank mergers are
treated as the “death” of each of the merging banks and the “birth” of the merged bank. To
give an illustrative example, “Credit Suisse,” “First Boston,” and “Credit Suisse First
Boston” are treated as three different firms.
121. The most frequent managers’ counsel are Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati (176),
Latham & Watkins (160), Davis Polk & Wardwell (151), Cravath, Swaine & Moore (111),
and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom (106). As with investment banks, law firm
mergers are treated as the death of each old firm and the birth of a new firm. In the rare
cases of multiple firms representing management, the two firms are treated as a single unit
for that transaction.
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strong indications of how well the parties to the deal have performed once
other relevant factors are controlled for.
With respect to price performance, for purposes of investigating the
extent to which frequency of interaction matters, I employ Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression analysis122 using the stock price increase during
the first day of trading (Appendix Table 1) and the price change after thirty,
sixty, and ninety days of trading, relative to the performance of the S&P
Index to account for the effect of market movements (Appendix Table 2).
With respect to the probability of price correction (Appendix Table 3) as
well as class action litigation (Appendix Table 4), I employ a probit
regression analysis.123 For upward price revision, I estimate the change in
probability that the parties to the deal will correctly raise the offering price
from the top of the initial filing range for deals that perform well in the
market. With respect to litigation, I estimate the change in probability that
a securities class action lawsuit will be filed in the first six months and the
first year after the IPO offer date.
In addition to these variables, I use a number of other independent
variables to ensure a generalizable result, in line with prior empirical
literature on IPOs.124 These variables include: (1) dummy variables for the
IPO year, (2) the industry category of the issuer (as determined according to
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code) to control for different
market conditions over time and in various industries, (3) each investment
bank in order to allow for variation in outcome variables associated with
each lead underwriter, as well as (4) the interaction of these variables.
(Appendix Figure A).125 In addition, for all specifications, I control for the
IPO size measured in terms of the gross proceeds of the offering, a variable
frequently used as a proxy for deal quality.126
122. OLS is a statistical method that attempts to find a function that approximately fits a
set of data; i.e., it attempts to determine the relationship between a set of explanatory
variables and an outcome variable of interest. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC
ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 53 (MIT Press 2010).
123. A probit model is a statistical model in which the outcome variable can take on only
one of two values; it is useful for estimating the probability of an event occurring, versus the
probability of the event not occurring. See id. at 566–67.
124. See e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; see also Eckbo et al., supra
note 7, at 276–79.
125. Dummy variables provide a method of controlling for variation within certain
categories of variables by removing the mean of the observations for the dependent variable
of interest. For example, in an OLS regression using first day price jump (i.e., underpricing)
as the dependent variable, fixed effects for (inter alia) each year are used. This allows for
variation in overall underpricing from year to year, by removing the mean underpricing for
each year and controlling for the variation in underpricing that is specific to that particular
year. So if, for example, 1999 was a year that saw a particularly large amount of
underpricing, the fixed effect would remove the year-specific average underpricing and
leave only the variation attributable to other factors. The same is done for each IPO quarter,
each lead underwriter, each industry, and the interaction of each industry and year. See
WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 122, at 307–10.
126. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33; Eckbo et al., supra note 7, at 276–
79. Regressions use the natural log of gross proceeds to mitigate skewness in the
distribution of dollar amounts. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–33. In
the alternative specifications in Appendix Tables 8 and 9, I also use the size of the company
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I perform each analysis using a number of alternative specifications to
test the robustness of the model. Appendix Tables 7 and 8 report the results
for analysis of the first day price increase and the probability of litigation
under the alternative specifications.
C. Main Results
This section illustrates some of the basic relationships in the raw data.
The figures below show that repeated bank-lawyer interactions in the past
year are associated with a greater opening day price jump, as well as greater
price performance after the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days
(relative to the S&P 500 Index).
Figure 2: Repeated Interactions and Price Performance

(measured by total assets) and the book value per share as alternatives ways to control for
deal quality. Regressions using total assets yield coefficients similar to those using the log
of gross proceeds, indicating that the latter is a good proxy for the size of the issuing
company.
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These graphs show that issues where the lead underwriting bank and
counsel have worked together repeatedly tend to exhibit superior price
performance (as well as underpricing) at incrementally higher levels. Of
course, this is merely descriptive, and there are many confounds that also
affect these performance measures. To attempt to investigate if this
relationship is real, I turn to OLS regression analysis controlling for factors
that influence market performance.
1. Price Performance Regression Analysis
The first performance measure analyzed is the opening day price jump.
Panel A of Appendix Table 1 shows the results, demonstrating a strong and
significant effect from increased bank-counsel interactions, even after
controlling very flexibly for year, industry, and bank fixed effects.
The first two specifications look at the number of bank-counsel
interactions within a year of the IPO, with and without bank fixed effects.
The subsequent columns look at the number of interactions in the preceding
two and three year periods. In all cases, the marginal effect of an additional
interaction is positive and statistically significant. There are two notable
trends across these specifications: the value of a marginal interaction
decreases as the time horizon increases, and the effect survives the
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introduction of bank fixed effects to control for quality concerns or bank
idiosyncrasies.
The next set of performance measures to be examined is the percentage
price change over the first thirty, sixty, and ninety trading days, relative to
the percentage change in the S&P Index over the same set of days to control
for the effect of overall market returns. The controls in all cases are
dummies for the IPO year, the SIC category, and the interaction of those
two sets.127 Robust standard errors are used for each regression.128
Panel A of Appendix Table 2 shows the results for the thirty, sixty, and
ninety-day price performance measures.
Deals involving frequent
collaborators are associated with strong market performance over the first
ninety days, as measured by price relative to the S&P 500 Index. The effect
of each additional interaction on the relative change in a stock’s price
relative to the S&P Index after thirty trading days is 4.4 percent when the
lawyer-underwriter collaborations occur within the past year. The marginal
performance price increase drops to 2.8 percent when the lawyer-bank
collaborations are spread over the past three years. Correspondingly, fewer
recent interactions between a bank and a law firm are strongly associated
with lower price performance over the same periods. The effect remains
for the first ninety days of trading, for which each deal in the past year is
associated with a 7.5 percent increase, declining to a 4.1 percent increase in
relative price for deals within the preceding three years.
From the regression analysis, it appears that frequency of interaction
bears a strong positive correlation with stock performance. This is
consistent with the hypothesis that teams of lawyers and bankers working
together repeatedly and over a short period of time are able to improve deal
outcomes, leading to a positive impact on the price of a stock. However,
these outcomes may also indicate overly high levels of underpricing,
especially because the price increase is sustained over the long term. In
addition, selection is a particular concern with respect to the underwriter
and its counsel because managing underwriters might be likely to pick the
same law firms repeatedly to do the best performing deals. In order to rule
out selection and tease apart positive relational impacts from negative ones,
I perform further tests below.
2. Selection
A concern with respect to interactions between the underwriters and their
counsel is the possibility that the results above are selection driven. After
all, underwriters select their counsel, and we might be concerned that their
selection criteria are related somehow to the outcomes analyzed above. If

127. Additional controls such as the syndicate size were not significant and so were not
reported.
128. To eliminate the possibility of clustering with respect to industry, bank, and year,
each regression was run using clustered standard errors on those dimensions with no change
in the significance of the results. See A. Colin Cameron et al., Robust Inference with
Multiway Clustering, 29 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 238, 238–49 (2011).
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that is the case, then the underwriter’s selection of counsel could be tied to
the quality of the issuer and the quality of the transaction as a whole, and
metrics such as price performance might simply be a result of the same
underlying considerations that led to the appointment of a particular law
firm. Therefore, the quality of the deal drives both the result and the
selection of counsel. For instance, if Goldman Sachs wins the lead
underwriting spot in a “hot” IPO, it may select its most preferred counsel,
Sullivan & Cromwell, to act as counsel on the deal, and because the deal is
“hot,” it may generate better market performance and/or more underpricing.
The most compelling argument against this possible selection story is
that the underwriter selects its counsel before due diligence takes place and
before the bookbuilding process begins, meaning that the worrisome early
selection takes place well before the bank is in a position to know how a
particular issue will perform in the market. One might nonetheless observe
that an underwriter can have a good sense of what sort of price performance
an issue will yield in advance of the bookbuilding itself—after all, the
underwriter has to come up with a proposed price range when making its
pitch to the issuer in the first place.
Even taking this fact into account, however, the incremental nature of the
results (i.e., that each additional interaction is associated with an
incremental increase in price performance on average) makes the selection
story above unlikely. That is the case because in order for selection to be
driving the results, it would have to be true that lead underwriters can
accurately and systematically predict the level of underpricing and market
price performance (as well as time to completion and litigation outcomes as
further discussed below) and choose different legal counsel a specific
number of times based on the precise predictions for each deal. That
scenario is extremely unlikely.129
Nonetheless, further analysis of the data is useful to provide evidence
that selection is unlikely to be driving the observed effects. I do this by
cutting the data to isolate observations that might plausibly be the product
of selection. As previously described, the most obvious selection story is
that investment banks managing high performing IPOs are more likely to
choose particular counsel repeatedly. If this were the case, it would also
produce a pattern in which repeated bank-counsel interactions are
associated with incrementally better market performance, as seen above.
To determine whether this selection story is supported by the data, I
observe that a relatively small group of investment banks typically leads the
“hot” IPOs. The banks that tend to get these deals are the ones that have
the greatest amount of IPO experience.130 I continue by limiting the sample
to those banks, creating smaller subgroups consisting of those banks that
serve as lead underwriter in at least forty issues in the dataset (the top
129. See, e.g., Telephone interview with Attorney (June 21, 2013) (name withheld by
request) (on file with author).
130. See id. In addition, prior to entering academia, I spent several years as an associate
in the capital markets department of a major international law firm, where I worked on IPOs
as well as other types of transactions.
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eighteen banks) and to those that manage at least eighty issues in the dataset
(the top seven banks).131 If the main results are selection driven, they
should disappear in the limited samples, because those samples contain
most of the “hot” IPOs, and any significant variation due to the quality of
the underwriter or the quality of the deal should flatten out. But as
Appendix Table 9 shows, the results remain even in these limited samples.
I conduct the same analysis using dollar market share in the year preceding
any given deal as a measure of bank quality, instead of the number of deals
in the dataset, and the results remain. To further rule out the possible
impact of selection, I perform the same regressions after removing all deals
in which the bank employs its “favorite” law firms. I determine a bank’s
“favorite” law firms in two different ways. First, I remove the deals
involving law firms with which banks have done the greatest number of
deals within the preceding one, two, and three years. Second, I remove
deals involving lawyer-underwriter pairs that are reported in interviews to
be favored lawyer-client relationships in equity capital markets. If selection
is driving the main results, and banks are simply picking their favored law
firms for the best deals, then the results should disappear when the deals
involving favored law firms are removed. However, the results remain.
Finally, I create a variable for the experience level of each law firm to see if
selection based on expertise might be driving the results. The results
remain when controlling for IPO experience of each firm. Moreover, when
the number of deals a firm has done in the past over the last one, two, and
three years is used as the dependent variable in regressions, instead of the
interactions between firms and investment banks, the effect does disappear.
This further indicates that the interaction between lawyers and their clients
impacts the deal beyond the lawyers’ experience alone. These results,
along with other robustness checks, are reported in Appendix Tables 7 and
8.
3. Performance Versus Excessive Underpricing
Another issue which complicates the interpretation of the data is that first
day price performance, or underpricing, has both good and bad
interpretations for deal quality. A very large opening day bounce can be
viewed not as an indicator of better stock performance, but rather as
evidence of pricing error on the part of underwriter and poor service
provided to the issuing company.132 However, as previously discussed, an
IPO can be considered a success for an underwriter even where

131. I note that the proxy used here for quality is different than that used in some other
studies. See Hanley & Hoberg, supra note 53, at 2830–34 (using dollar market share for the
previous year as a measure of underwriter quality). However, for present purposes, the
number of deals works as well or better than other measures because it more directly relates
to the potential selection problem inherent in repeated interactions with counsel.
Nonetheless, as a test for robustness, I tested the more commonly employed measure of
quality (dollar market share for the preceding year). The results remained.
132. See generally Alexander, supra note 12 (discussing a theory of underpricing as an
artifact of error, combined with abundance of caution).
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underpricing is high, because underwriters are able to capture value through
trading commissions on the IPO stock (the trading of which tends to
increase the more underpriced the stock is), as well as quid pro quo
business from favored investors who receive allocations of the underpriced
stock and profit from the rise in its price.133 In order to better understand
how to interpret first day price increase and the effect of repeated
interactions, it is necessary to parse the underpricing puzzle more finely.
Understanding the implications of underpricing for the relationship
between the underwriter and its counsel requires a brief detour into the vast
economic literature on underpricing. Numerous theoretical explanations for
underpricing have been advanced, and a few that are especially relevant to
the analysis here are worth noting.134 One such explanation is that the
underpricing serves as a compensation mechanism for investment banks’
favored institutional clients, who often bear risk by agreeing to purchase
shares in IPO issuers.135 The banks need these investors to ensure adequate
demand for stock in certain offerings, including offerings in which the risk
of return is uncertain. Banks compensate these clients for agreeing to
purchase such stock (and thus ensure adequate demand for the offering) by
giving an essentially guaranteed margin of return through the underpricing.
Another possible explanation is that underpricing is a form of insurance
against the risk of liability, as a stock that performs well relative to its offer
price is much less frequently the subject of litigation than those which
perform poorly.136 Regardless of the explanation, the phenomenon is
generally seen as a transfer of value from the issuing company, which
receives a lower price for the stock than it otherwise could, to the initial
investors (and indirectly the investment banks), who realize the gain. Thus,
while underpricing might be necessary, the issuer would seek to keep it at a
minimum, where the underwriter would seek to maximize it in the pricing
negotiation.
Most relevantly, various studies have investigated whether different
attributes of the major players in the IPO process are related to the level of
underpricing. A number of studies have found an association between

133. See Griffith, supra note 11, at 591–92.
134. Most of the theoretical explanations come from finance literature. See generally
James R. Booth & Richard L. Smith III, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification
Hypothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261 (1986); Kevin Rock, Why New Issues Are Underpriced, 15
J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1986); Seha M. Tiniç, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common
Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789 (1988). However, the legal literature has addressed the issue as well.
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 17–22; Yoram Barzel et al., Prevention Is Better than
Cure: The Role of IPO Syndicates in Precluding Information Acquisition, 79 J. BUS. 2911,
2911–13 (2006); Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 16–21; Richard A. Booth, Going
Public, Selling Stock, and Buying Liquidity, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 649, 649–51
(2007); Spindler, supra note 12, at 15–16.
135. See generally Murat M. Binay et al., The Role of Underwriter-Investor Relationships
in the IPO Process, 42 J. FIN. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 785 (2007).
136. See Tiniç, supra note 134, at 789–95, 803–15 (explaining the liability theory and
testing it empirically).
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greater underwriter reputation and lower levels of underpricing.137 At the
same time, one prominent study found the opposite to be true, particularly
in offerings of smaller issuers.138 Another set of studies examined IPO
auditors, finding that greater auditor reputation and level of compensation
were strongly associated with lower levels of underpricing.139 Of those, a
few have looked at the relationship of counsel in the deal and the existence
and/or degree of underpricing.
Studies of the relationship between legal counsel and underpricing have
presented a mixed picture. One study examined the relationship of the
issuer’s counsel’s reputation, measured by level of compensation, and
found a correlation between counsel with a good reputation and lower
levels of underpricing.140 The explanation for this is thought to be either
that better counsel help the issuer to be more aggressive in its negotiations
and advocate for more positive disclosure in the prospectus, or that they
provide quality assurance to the underwriters, or both.141 Another study
examined the impact on underpricing of the experience level of
underwriter’s counsel, using a law firm’s market share within its particular
geographic area to determine experience level.142 This study found a strong
negative correlation between the experience level of the manager’s counsel
and the level of upward price adjustment from the initial offering range.
Those authors theorize that this effect is the result of more experienced
counsel’s ability to require more negative disclosure about an issuer in the
preliminary and final prospectus, because this disclosure is the primary
basis for the bank’s marketing efforts, which in turn affects the final
price.143 These authors cite previous studies showing upward price
adjustment as correlated with underpricing to conclude that high-experience
law firms help to create less underpricing.144
In order to separate what might be considered positive implications of
underpricing from negative ones, as well as to isolate the impact of
familiarity among the parties, it is necessary to analyze (1) what elements
of the first day bounce data would be consistent with a deal that performs
well and inconsistent with pricing error or agency problems between the
underwriter and issuer, and (2) whether either of the above can be explained
by experience or quality of the lawyers or underwriters, as opposed to
137. See, e.g., Carter & Manaster, supra note 73, at 1046; Barondes & Sanger, supra note
81, at 16–21.
138. See Loughran & Ritter, supra note 12, at 11–12, 30–31.
139. See Beatty, supra note 73, at 693–709; Randolph P. Beatty, The Economic
Determinants of Auditor Compensation in the Initial Public Offerings Market, 31 J. ACCT.
RES. 294, 294–300 (1993).
140. Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 561, 596. For a study on the relationship between
IPO market share by bank and announcement of an investigation by the SEC, see generally
Beatty et al., The Indirect Economic Penalties in SEC Investigations of Underwriters, 50 J.
FIN. ECON. 151 (1998).
141. See Beatty & Welch, supra note 74, at 595–97.
142. See Barondes & Sanger, supra note 81, at 2–3, 19–21.
143. See id.
144. See id.; see also Kathleen Weiss Hanley, The Underpricing of Initial Public
Offerings and the Partial Adjustment Phenomenon, 34 J. FIN. ECON. 231, 231–36 (1993).
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factors related to the interactions between the lawyers and bankers. The
following sections perform this analysis, revealing both inconsistencies
with the underpricing explanation and strong indications of a wellperforming deal.
a. Upward Price Revision
To test whether the first day bounce is more consistent with good
performance versus error or lack of independence, I look at the propensity
for accurate upward price revision between the initial offer range and the
offer price in the presence of high levels of underpricing, when lawyers and
managing underwriters have worked together more frequently. A greater
propensity for correct price revision linked to counsel’s interaction with the
underwriter would indicate lower error rates, and possibly greater
independence on the part of counsel, because the underwriter typically
prefers to keep the price down and benefits less from revising up.145
To examine this, I first construct two measures of strong performers, or
companies whose stock price after thirty trading days is at least 20 percent
and 30 percent higher, respectively, than the midpoint of their filing price
range (controlling for the performance of the S&P Index during the same
thirty days). The reason for doing this is to find issuances that clearly
exceed the level of underpricing for new issues that would be intended and
advertised by a typical underwriter (usually 15 to 20 percent) and therefore
should presumably have had an upward price revision if the price is to
remain at 15 to 20 percent below the “correct” level. I then calculate the
probability of an upward price revision occurring before the deal closes for
those deals in which the bank and counsel have worked together frequently
and for those deals in which the bank and counsel have not worked together
frequently. For this analysis, banks and counsel are considered to have
worked together frequently if they have worked together at least three times
in the preceding two years. If the first day bounce associated with repeated
interactions is the result of greater error rates, or an intentional scheme to
price at a low level, one should expect the probability of an upward revision
to be lower when the bank and counsel have worked together more
frequently. However, the analysis shows the opposite. Figure 3 shows
these probabilities in the raw data.

145. A possible contrary interpretation would be that repeated interactions cause the
underwriter to be less effective when negotiating the price with the issuer. However, as
explained below in the discussion of integer versus decimal pricing, this interpretation is
unlikely.
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Figure 3: Upward Price Revisions

As Figure 3 shows, there is greater propensity for upward price
correction, and efforts to reduce underpricing, when banks and their
lawyers are frequent collaborators. When banks and their counsel do not
work together often, upward price revision occurs a little more than 45
percent of the time. However, when the two are frequent collaborators, the
probability is nearly 60 percent.
To measure this effect precisely, I employ a probit regression to
determine whether the offer price was revised upward past the maximum of
the initial offer range for the sample of issues that showed a significant
increase in value (20 percent and 30 percent above the upper filing range on
the thirtieth trading day, controlling for S&P returns during that time
period). Panel A of Appendix Table 3 shows the results of the probit
regression (marginal effects are reported). Frequent collaborators are 8 to 9
percent more likely to correctly revise the filing price upward past the high
end of the initial offer range for strong performers.146 This finding in turn
further supports a conclusion that relational dynamics between the
underwriter and its counsel help to improve the deal overall. The upward
price correction implies, however, that the lead underwriter is capturing less
of the benefits of underpricing because it means that their favored
institutional clients will not gain as much as they otherwise might have.
146. Other studies that examine price revision typically measure from the midpoint of the
initial offer range to the closing price on the first day of trading. See, e.g., Hanley & Hoberg,
supra note 53, at 2830–34. I use the high end of the offer range to the first day closing price,
which results in a smaller calculated price increase. The measure is intentionally
conservative, to err on the side of caution. Employing the methodology used in other studies
would have made the results in this specification appear stronger.
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Nonetheless, as upward revision in these deals is also accompanied by very
strong first day performance, it is reasonable to conclude that the overall
effect is beneficial—the price is more accurate, the issuer gets more than it
otherwise might have, and the underwriter and its customers still garner a
very large share of the value.
I note that an alternative possible interpretation posited in the literature is
that price revision in fact represents lower levels of due diligence by the
underwriter and counsel prior to the offering.147 Scholars advancing this
interpretation reason that pricing can be done one of two ways: through
pre-offering information discovery (via due diligence) or through
bookbuilding, during which investors convey pricing information to the
issuer and underwriters by means of the demand they express for the
stock.148 Some scholars posit that there is a tradeoff between due diligencerelated ex ante pricing and ex post price discovery through bookbuilding.149
If enough information is available to price the stock before bookbuilding,
then the disclosure will be more informative and there will be a lower
incidence of price revision during bookbuilding.150 Likewise, if less
diligence is conducted, then disclosure will be less informative and use
more boilerplate language, resulting in the need to rely on the bookbuilding
process for price discovery and leading to more price revision once
bookbuilding is complete and demand for the stock is known.151 It is
beyond the scope of this Article to analyze the plausibility of this
interpretation in detail. However, I note that even if this interpretation is
correct, it would support the conclusion that the repeated representations
are related to an increasingly better outcome for the underwriter. This is
because the underwriter, if given a choice, would prefer to allow for price
discovery ex post through bookbuilding over conducting costly and timeconsuming research ex ante.152 According to this interpretation, from the
underwriter’s perspective, ex post price discovery is more efficient because
the underwriter expends fewer resources than it would through more
diligence (which is expensive and time-consuming), but is still just as well
off, if not better off, because it does not suffer ill effects from underpricing,
and may even benefit from it. Under this interpretation, the price revision
result implies that price discovery is taking place during bookbuilding,
which is efficient from the underwriter’s perspective.
b. Isolating the Effects of Interaction from
Experience or Reputation
To test whether the results with respect to price performance could be
driven by the experience or reputation of counsel or the underwriters, I

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
See generally id.
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construct variables to account for the experience of both as signaled by the
number of deals done in a given industry and within a given time period. I
also create variables to represent the market share of each bank and firm
during the year preceding any particular deal, to provide a measure of the
prestige of each firm. I use these variables in the regressions specified
above to see if they impact the result, and find that they do not. These
results are reported in Appendix Tables 7, 8, 11, and 12. That measures of
both bank and law firm experience, as well as measures of reputation as
proxied by market share, do not change the estimates in the model strongly
indicates that the results are not driven by experience and substantive skill,
or by reputation and signaling effects with respect to either the banks or the
firms. This in turn provides support for the conclusion that relational
factors resulting from repeated interaction drive the results.
4. Litigation
The filing of securities litigation is a salient indicator of deal
performance, particularly if it happens within a relatively short period of
time following the IPO.153 Securities liability can arise for numerous
reasons and does not necessarily indicate problems with the lawyers or their
relationship with their clients. Nonetheless, a systematic pattern of either
increased or decreased litigation may indicate either weaker or stronger
disclosure and deals.
In order to examine whether interaction has any impact on litigation, I
perform a probit regression on the occurrence of class action lawsuits
within six months and within one year154 of an IPO for which the
underwriter and the underwriter’s counsel were frequent collaborators.
While the timeframes are somewhat arbitrary, it is often the case that IPOrelated class actions are filed within the first year.155 Controls are the same
as those used in the previous regressions. The results are shown in Panel A
of Appendix B Table 4.
The regressions reveal no significant relationship between litigation and
frequent interaction between the underwriter and its counsel within the
preceding year. The negative coefficient for class actions within six months
indicates that, if anything, there may be a very small decrease in the
probability of short-term litigation, but there is not enough of a relationship
to draw any strong conclusions. The lack of significant result remains for
deals within the past two and three years as well. The lack of relationship is

153. Class actions were filed within one year with respect to 119 of the issuers in the
dataset, after discounting multiple separate class actions filed with respect to the same issuer.
This number constitutes 4.36 percent of the dataset.
154. The six-month and one-year cutoffs are more conservative than those used in other
studies of IPO litigation. See, e.g., Michelle Lowry & Susan Shu, Litigation Risk and IPO
Underpricing, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 309, 315 (2002) (analyzing the occurrence of litigation at any
time after the IPO). The six-month and one-year cutoff are used to ensure that litigation is
related to the IPO, and in particular, the IPO-related work product that the lawyers would
have produced.
155. See id. at 315 (discussing statistics on lawsuits filed).
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noteworthy in comparison to the incidence of litigation seen in relation to
other interactions, as discussed below.
Before concluding the analysis of litigation as well as short-term price
performance, I should note another prominent, but unlikely, theory of
underpricing that could affect the interpretation. This theory explains
underpricing as a form of insurance against IPO-related litigation.156 To
understand why this might make sense, consider that section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933 imposes liability for material misstatements in a
prospectus that lead to losses by investors.157 Underwriting banks have
been able to escape liability in such lawsuits by claiming that they
conducted adequate due diligence and that statements in the prospectus
were true to the best of their knowledge;158 however, issuing companies are
not able to employ a due diligence defense and therefore bear strict liability
for material misstatements that result in losses to investors.159 Liability
under section 11 is limited to the difference between the market price of the
stock and the offering price.160 In practice, this means that an issuer faces
potential liability any time its stock price drops below the offering price
after the IPO, because even frivolous claims usually settle before the
existence of any material misstatement or omission is ever adjudicated on
the merits.161 With that danger in mind, issuers and their underwriters
might use underpricing as a form of insurance against section 11 liability
because if the offering price is low enough, it is very unlikely that the
market price will drop below it.162
156. See generally Tiniç, supra note 134 (originating the hypothesis that underpricing
serves as insurance for litigation). See also Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309–11
(providing empirical support for the litigation insurance explanation for underpricing).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012).
158. See, e.g., Escott v. Bar-Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688–89 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (establishing the due diligence defense for non-issuer defendants in prospectus-related
litigation if the defendant can show reasonable grounds for that belief after a reasonable
investigation into the truth of the alleged misstatements).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3).
160. See id. § 77k(e).
161. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Screening Effect of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 6 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 35, 35–36 (2009) (noting that securities class actions
almost always end in settlement regardless of the merits because “defendants, anxious to
avoid the distraction of litigation, high defense attorney fees, negative publicity surrounding
a securities lawsuit, and the specter of potentially bankrupting damages, may be willing to
pay a ‘nuisance’ settlement to make the case go away, even when they perceive the
likelihood of the plaintiff succeeding at trial as rather low”). The perception of high levels
of frivolous litigation was one of the motivations behind the passage of the Private Securities
Litigations Reform Act of 1995. Id.
162. The issuer and underwriters can be—and often are—sued under section 10 and Rule
10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in connection with IPO-related losses. See id.
at 41–42. Damages for such actions are not limited by the offering price, but the issuer is
not subject to strict liability for damages in such cases. Compare Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 201 (1976) (holding that “§ 10(b) [of the Exchange Act] was
addressed to practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose
liability for negligent conduct alone”), and 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (providing for “damages
caused by” reliance on material misstatements or omissions), with 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)
(providing for strict liability), and 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (permitting damages “not exceeding
the price at which the security was offered to the public”). I focus in this section on liability
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If underpricing is insurance against litigation, then one might interpret
the first day price jump results above, and the lack of any reduction in
probability in litigation reported in this section, to conclude that frequent
interaction is causing issuers to pay for costly insurance that is having no
measurable effect. This would, of course, indicate a negative outcome from
repeated interactions.
However, while the underpricing-as-insurance argument makes logical
sense, it is widely disputed, and a priori problematic for a number of
reasons. First, there is evidence that underpricing leads to higher share
turnover in the aftermarket as investors who bought early seek to make a
quick profit by selling their cheaply purchased shares into the rising
market.163 Higher share turnover in the aftermarket, in turn, is an input of
increased litigation.164 Therefore, underpricing may be just as likely to
draw litigation as is it is to deter it.
Second, and more significantly, using underpricing as litigation insurance
does not make economic sense because it would be vastly more expensive
than what would be warranted given the expected costs of IPO litigation.165
This is because the costs given up by the issuer due to high levels of
underpricing are likely to be much higher than the ex ante expected cost of
litigation in most circumstances, even taking into account non-liability
related transaction costs, such as the costs of counsel, reputational costs,
and management’s time and energy costs.166
under section 11 of the Securities Act because that section is the primary source of liability
for IPO firms, see Choi et al., supra note 161, at 41, and provides much of the rationale for
the litigation insurance explanation for underpricing, see Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at
309–13.
163. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Strategic IPO Underpricing, Information Momentum,
and Lockup Expiration Selling, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 105, 107 (2002) (describing this model as
an alternative interpretation).
164. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 320–21. Lowry and Shu use market turnover
as an input into litigation risk. See id. at 321 (“Stock turnover, measured as the proportion of
shares traded at least once during a given period, is also related to plaintiffs’ incentives to
initiate lawsuits. This is because shareholder damages are generally increasing in the
number of shares traded at the allegedly misleading prices. . . . Not surprisingly, sued firms
have significantly higher turnover.”).
165. This point has been made by numerous critics of the litigation insurance hypothesis.
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 12, at 19–20.
166. To illustrate, the average probability of class action litigation within the first year for
all deals in the dataset is 4 percent. The average payment for settlement of securities class
actions is approximately $3 million. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 310, 315 (noting
average settlement payment of $3.3 million in “lawsuit sample . . . of all firms that had an
IPO between 1988 and 1995”). Meanwhile, the average level of underpricing is closer to 20
percent, which on average amounts to $300 million left on the table given the average deal
size in the dataset (or $152 million in terms of median deal size in the dataset). This means
that underpricing would be the equivalent of paying roughly $152 million to $300 million to
avoid an average expected litigation cost of $1.2 million ($3 million * .04), making
underpricing an extraordinarily high price to pay to avoid litigation cost, even accounting for
reputational and other harms that result from litigation. See also Qing Hao, Securities
Litigation, Withdrawal Risk and Initial Public Offerings, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 438, 454 (2011)
(reporting the results of a recent empirical analysis showing no reliable relation between
underpricing and subsequent litigation risk for U.S. IPOs from 1996 to 2005); Jay R. Ritter,
Equilibrium in the Initial Public Offerings Market, 3 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 347, 354 (2011)
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Third, it has been widely noted that other countries with developed
securities markets have far less securities litigation, and are much less
plaintiff friendly, but still have underpricing similar to what is seen in many
U.S. IPOs.167 Therefore, it is unlikely that the lack of any association
between lawyer-client familiarity and reduction in litigation rates has any
negative implications for the other results reported here.
5. Disclosure
The amount of different types of disclosure in the prospectus does not, by
itself, indicate a positive or negative outcome for the deal. However,
because disclosure is a facet of the deal most directly influenced by
counsel, it is useful to analyze it, both to inform the other results and to
provide some insight on the possible mechanisms at work in the results
previously reported.
Appendix Table 10, Panel A, shows the effects of repeated interactions
between an underwriter and its counsel and risk factors. The table
demonstrates a significant effect from repeated interaction: each additional
deal together in the preceding year is associated with a 30 percent increase
in the proportion of the prospectus occupied by risk factors. For repeated
deals in the past two years, the marginal increase is 20 percent, and for
three years, it is 15 percent, all significant at the .1 percent level.168
The content and impact of different risk factors vary, and so it is not
always clear which party, if any, benefits from increased levels of such
disclosure. On the one hand, it is potentially prophylactic against litigation.
On the other hand, it may lead to underpricing and even provide a roadmap
for litigation. Generally speaking, the underwriter in a typical IPO tends to
favor more negative disclosure than the issuer. This is due to the fact that,
unlike the issuer, the underwriter benefits from negative disclosure, as it
gains protection from liability while suffering few of its costs, because it
can benefit even if the offering price is negatively impacted.169 Therefore,
from a better team dynamic between underwriters and counsel one would
predict an increased proportion of negative to positive disclosure (estimated
here as the share of the prospectus devoted to risk factors).
Despite the ambiguity of the level of disclosure, given the lack of
association between repeated interactions and litigation demonstrated in the
preceding section, a tentative inference can be drawn that the increase in
risk factor disclosure is beneficial. The benefit likely inures to the
underwriter more than the issuer, as the underwriter stands to lose less and

(“This lawsuit avoidance theory of underpricing has the problem that leaving money on the
table is an incredibly inefficient way of deterring lawsuits: The opportunity cost in foregone
proceeds is $1 for what is at most a few cents of expected benefits.”).
167. See Ritter, supra note 166, at 354 (“[T]he litigation environment in the U.S. is fairly
unique, yet the magnitude of IPO underpricing in the U.S. is not unusual.”).
168. Results for share of the prospectus devoted to MD&A were not significant and not
reported.
169. See, e.g., Ritter & Welch, supra note 12, at 1810; see also Nocera, supra note 14.
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gain more from underpricing and thus has a different cost-benefit analysis
with respect to litigation risk.
6. Time to Deal Completion
Repeated interaction reveals a small but significant positive effect on the
length of time to complete a deal. If repeated interaction and better
teamwork yield positive benefits, one would expect efficiency and speed to
be one of them. Therefore, I test the data to see if repeated interactions
between underwriters and counsel lead to a decrease in the length of time
that deals take. As mentioned in the previous section, many factors could
influence the timing of the offering, and some of those factors cannot be
controlled for in a regression. Therefore, while the lack of a trend would
not necessarily be troubling, a general trend would provide further evidence
of negative or positive effects from repeated interactions.
I analyze the length of time between the date that Form S-1 is filed with
the SEC and the offer date. This time period is only a portion of the entire
length of the deal, but it nonetheless must serve as a proxy because it is the
only observable information regarding the length of time to complete the
deal. Because the timing of the deal may depend on market conditions in a
relatively narrow stretch of time leading up to the offering, I construct a
dummy variable for each quarter of the IPO year, instead of using the entire
year variable as in other regressions. In addition, the number of lead
managers in the deal have a significant impact on deal length (each
additional manager increases the deal length by approximately six days), so
the managers are added to the group of controls. In my preferred
specification, I limit the analysis to deals that are completed within one
year, because the presence of a number of long-dated deals in the dataset
raises the possibility of overstating the true effect of repeated interactions.
The results are reported in Panel A of Appendix Table 5.
The results of the analysis indicate a modest but significant reduction by
almost two days in the amount of time to complete a deal, for each repeated
interaction within the past year. This effect fades in both magnitude and
significance for repeated interactions within two and three years. In
general, however, the trend supports the idea that better teamwork produces
better results.
7. Integer Versus Decimal Pricing
The type of price arrived at likewise indicates positive benefits for the
underwriter from repeated interaction with its counsel. Other research on
IPOs hypothesizes that if an IPO is priced using a non-integer number then
the issuer’s management team had more information and negotiated more
effectively over price than might otherwise be the case.170 The reason for

170. See Daniel J. Bradley et al., Negotiation and the IPO Offer Price: A Comparison of
Integer Vs. Non-Integer IPOs, 39 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 517, 518 (2004)
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this conclusion is that arriving at whole numbers in a negotiation suggests
less thorough analysis of relevant criteria and more reliance on anchoring
techniques.171
Panel A of Appendix Table 6 reports the results of a probit regression
measuring the change in probability of a non-integer price with repeated
interactions. The results show a small but significant effect, with each
repeated interaction within the past year resulting in a 1.3 percent lower
chance of the final price being an integer.172 Significance does not remain
for interactions over two and three years. Nonetheless, this may indicate a
stronger negotiating position on the part of the underwriter, aided by
assistance from familiar counsel.
D. Interactions Between Issuer’s Counsel and Underwriter’s Counsel
One might expect the lawyers on either side of the table in a capital
markets deal to gain perhaps the most from repeated interaction. These
individuals encounter each other frequently, and a good working
relationship can help them to work more effectively together. Analysis of
frequent interaction between sets of counsel, however, yields few
significant results.
1. Price Performance
As before, first day price increase is examined for counsel-counsel repeat
interactions. The results for first day price increase, reported in Panel B of
Appendix Table 1, indicate a moderate but significant effect. These
significant but modest price gains are sustained over thirty, sixty, and
ninety days, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 2
2. Price Revision
I again examine the probability of correct upward price revision and find
there is a weakly significant (at the 10 percent level) relationship between
interactions and the probability of upward price revision when the first day
bounce is 30 percent or more. No other significant results are seen. These
results are reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 3.
3. Litigation
Each additional interaction between sets of counsel is associated with a
small (0.5 percent) and weakly significant (at the 10% level) decrease in
class action litigation filed within six months following the IPO offer date.
No significant relationship is seen when the time period is expanded to one
year, as shown in Panel B of Appendix Table 4.
(arguing that non-integer prices represent more negotiation effort and less uncertainty
regarding offer price).
171. See id. at 528–29. This methodology is borrowed from Bradley and his coauthors.
172. Out of 2265 deals in the dataset, 383 (14.03 percent) came to a final price using a
decimal number.
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4. Disclosure
Counsel deals together continue the trend of marginally increasing risk
factor disclosure, as reported in Panel B of Appendix Table 10. The degree
of increase remains relatively constant regardless of whether the previous
interaction has taken place in the past one year (19 percent), two years (17.3
percent), or three years (15 percent).173 Once again, this result is obtained
after controlling for factors that might otherwise influence risk factors or
the riskiness of the firm overall: the firm’s industry, the time period, the
age of the company, the size of the company (measured by company
assets), and the involvement of sophisticated venture capital investors. This
suggests that the inclusion of additional risk factors may be driven more by
norms of legal practice with regard to prospectus drafting than by anything
related to the deal itself or the parties at the table.
As above, risk factors increasing while the probability of a securities
class action either decreases or bears no relationship to risk factors, could
indicate that the two sets of counsel, working together more frequently, are
doing marginally better work and protecting firms from litigation (at least
in the first six months).
5. Deal Timing and Integer Pricing
No significant relationship was identified between repeated interaction
among sets of counsel and deal completion times or the probability of an
integer final price, as shown in Panel B of Appendix Tables 5 and 6. This
is somewhat surprising, given that better team dynamics would presumably
create a more efficient process. However, the length of time a deal takes
may be affected by many factors outside the lawyers’ control. The timing
of the deal is also usually managed by the underwriters more than other
parties at the table, so perhaps it should not be surprising that counsel does
not affect it. Testing for integer pricing yields a marginally significant, but
very small negative result. This result indicates that counsel pairs may have
a very small effect on what kind of price issuers choose. However, this
result may also be an artifact of the reality that there are many counsel
interactions and relatively few non-integer prices in the dataset.
E. Summary of Findings and Interpretation of Results
Taken together, the results above indicate some positive benefits
associated with repeated collaboration between underwriters and their
counsel, as well as between different sets of lawyers on opposite sides of a
deal. In particular, when the lead underwriter and its counsel have worked
together frequently, deals tend to perform better in the short and long term,
and they are less marked by signs of pricing error or excessively high,
unmitigated underpricing. While negative and risk-related disclosure

173. Each is significant at the 1 percent level. Results for share of the prospectus devoted
to MD&A were not significant and not reported.
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increase somewhat in such interactions, there is no corresponding
association with litigation in the first year, when IPO-related litigation is
most likely. The data also suggests that deals get done slightly faster.
Similar results are evident for deals in which both sets of counsel have
worked together frequently, except that there is a small but significant
negative marginal effect on litigation within the first year but there is no
significant effect on deal timing. This suggests that counsels’ relational
dynamics in these situations improves the transaction by reducing
uncertainty, the cost of information production, and lowering agency costs
and transaction costs.
With respect to the two sets of counsel, the results are more mixed. First
day price jump increases modestly in repeated interactions, indicating low
levels of underpricing. Nonetheless, no significant result is seen with
respect to price correction. This could simply be due to more accurate
pricing to begin with, or it might indicate that repeated interactions between
counsel have a relatively modest impact on the ability of the deal team to
market the deal. The strong price performance over the first thirty, sixty,
and ninety days is also related to repeated interactions, further indicating
good deal execution. Repeated interactions are weakly associated with
lower probability of litigation, at least in the first six months after the
offering.
F. Caveats and Robustness Checks
While the associations described above provide interesting insights, the
regression analysis alone gives no assurance that some underlying factors
are not driving the repeated selection of both the banks and the different
sets of counsel, as well as the results. For instance, the industry of the
company going public, the size of the company, the time period of the IPO,
or the recent experience of a particular law firm in a particular industry
might all factor into the choice to use the same counsel for multiple deals in
a given time period. At the same time, such factors could influence the
results of the deal, without regard to the effect of repeated interaction. To
conclude that repeated interaction is indeed driving the results, I must rule
out the impacts of such factors as drivers of the results. I employ a number
of strategies to do so.
As previously explained, to rule out the impact of time period and
industry, I use year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and the interaction
of the two. In alternative specifications, I use a fixed effect for the quarter
in which an IPO occurs, interacted with the industry of the issuing
company. I also use the geographic location by ZIP code of each firm, and
the results remain. In my main specification, I also use a fixed effect for
each underwriter, with no significant change in the results. In addition,
there are several years in the dataset in which IPO activity, as well as
several of the outcome variables analyzed in the paper, is especially high.
The years 1999 and 2000 have especially high numbers of IPOs (as well as
repeated interactions) and are associated with very high levels of
underpricing and litigation. Although the use of fixed effects for these
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years removes the mean of the impact of these years on the outcomes, as a
further test of robustness I remove all deals completed in these years from
the data set completely, and the results remain.
As discussed above, law firm experience and reputation are also unlikely
to be driving the results. When a control for law firm experience is used,
the results do not change. In addition, if “law firm deals” is used as a
dependent variable in the analysis, no effect is apparent. Further, the
consensus among practitioners interviewed for the study is that the markets
do not consider the reputation of the law firms representing the parties in
the deal when making investment decisions. This may reflect that all of the
firms who do IPOs are of sufficiently high quality, and therefore reputation
does not matter per se to investors. But in any event, law firm reputation
and experience do not explain the results.
Nor is it problematic that issuers’ and underwriters’ choice of law firm is
often based on either a previous relationship or recent experience doing
IPOs in a given industry. Indeed, that explanation would be consistent with
the findings above, as well as other empirical research on clients’ choice of
It would be difficult to imagine how such previous
lawyers.174
relationships would be related to the outcomes analyzed herein, except
through the relational effects I am studying. With respect to the law firms’
recent experience and reputation, I employ several strategies to rule these
out as confounding factors. To rule out the possibility that law firm quality
or experience is driving the result, I construct variables to represent the
number of deals each firm has done in the previous one year, two years, and
three years in each industry and overall. These variables do not change the
results when added to the model. I also add fixed effects for certain law
firms that appear most frequently in the dataset, and the results remain.175
Finally, other factors that may influence selection of counsel, as well as
the outcome variables, are factors related to the quality of the deal,
availability of information about the issuer, and sophistication of the
parties. These factors are: the presence of venture capital or private equity
investors, the age of the company (which impacts the amount of
information available about the company), the value of the company in
terms of total assets, the value of the company as determined by book value
per share, the size of the underwriting syndicate, and the proportion of
insider stock sold in the deal.176 Including these factors in the model yields
the same results as those obtained in my preferred specification. All results

174. See Coates et al., supra note 1, at 999–1001.
175. In particular, Wilson Sonsini appears a disproportionately high number of times on
the dataset (n=426). Adding a fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini does not change the results.
Removing Wilson Sonsini completely from the dataset lowers the precision of the estimates
in the model such that they are no longer significant, which is to be expected when removing
such a large number of data points. Nonetheless the results remain even under that
specification.
176. Recall also that deal size, measured by the log of gross proceeds, is a standard
control in all specifications.
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discussed in the subsection are reported in Appendix Tables 7 and 8 for the
first day price bounce and probability of litigation variables.
To illustrate the point further, the results with respect to an issuing
company’s counsel could be interpreted to suggest that some underlying
factors are driving both underpricing and litigation risk, as well as the
selection of counsel. This explanation draws from theories of underpricing
as both insurance for, and deterrent to, litigation previously mentioned.177
Under this theory, the level of underpricing might correspond to the
litigation risk inherent in the issue, on the assumption that pricing lower
would reduce the probability of the issuance being overpriced. An
overpriced issue draws more litigation because when the price inevitably
falls in the market, investors lose money and often will bring suit.
Moreover, where there is inherent uncertainty regarding the issuer’s
valuation or industry, underpricing may further help to mitigate the
associated risks.178
The tests described here make this interpretation unlikely, because if this
story were true, one would expect to see the underpricing and litigation
effects disappear when controlling for factors that would ex ante impact the
risk of litigation for a particular firm. However, that result is not observed.
The systematic incremental nature of the results (i.e., that each additional
interaction is associated with an incremental increase in underpricing and
litigation on average) also makes it unlikely that there is an underlying
factor driving the results as well as the selection of counsel. In order for
such underlying factors to be at work, it would have to be true that the
parties selecting members of the deal team are doing so based on a very
accurate prediction of the future levels of underpricing and litigation. This
would mean not only systematically predicting the level of underpricing
and litigation with a high degree of accuracy, but also choosing different
counsel and banks to work together and across the table from each other a
specific number of times based on the specific prediction for each deal. As
discussed above, that scenario is extremely unlikely, especially once other
possible confounding factors are controlled for.
III. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
The findings above indicate that the frequency of lawyer-client
interaction bears a significant relationship to the quality of IPO deal
outcomes. This has implications for how deals are currently structured and
the lawyers’ conception of their role in a transaction. Below, I discuss what
these implications are for teamwork in deal making and the principal-agent
relationship between lawyers and their clients.

177. See Lowry & Shu, supra note 154, at 309, 320–21; see also Alexander, supra note
12, at 19 (“A large literature has attempted to explain IPO underpricing. One intriguing
theory is that IPOs are underpriced as a form of insurance against legal liability based on
claims of federal securities law violations on the offering.”).
178. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 18–20 (explaining the litigation theory).
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A. Lawyers, Clients, and Teamwork
The results described above do not reveal the precise mechanism by
which repeated interaction relates to the deal outcomes I have examined.
More research is required to elaborate precisely how such a relationship
might work. However, a plausible explanation is that repeated interaction
and familiarity produce better teamwork, which results in reduced
transaction costs, better disclosure, and more effective use of each team
member’s time and expertise. In this section, I discuss how the findings
above might fit into existing models of law practice. I start by discussing
how the findings are consistent with the role of teamwork in transactional
practice and argue that teamwork should be considered more carefully and
intentionally with respect to lawyers and their clients. I also discuss some
potentially problematic aspects of teamwork for lawyers, and I argue that
team dynamics should be more actively designed and managed to avoid
these problems.
1. Importance of Teamwork for Deal Lawyers
IPO transactions can fairly be described as team production endeavors,
although teamwork is only starting to be considered seriously in legal
theory or practice.179 When teamwork is discussed, it often focuses on
teamwork among lawyers working together in a firm, but leaves out
consideration of the teamwork between lawyers and their clients, or
teamwork with opposing counsel. Effective cooperation across these
different dimensions is also important to a lawyer’s effectiveness, and it
warrants further consideration.
Teams in the legal context can be defined, borrowing from social
science, as a bounded social system whose members are interdependent and
whose members are working toward a shared purpose.180 The benefits of
teamwork over individual effort have been well documented.181 Despite
this fact, and the prevalence of team tasks in the practice of law, the
profession is only beginning to provide the necessary attention to relational
skills or to the systematic study of a matter of theoretical importance or
skills training. Lawyers and their professional governance are more
frequently analyzed through the lens of principal-agent theory,182 although
an equally appropriate lens would be that of team production theory in
certain instances. This is especially true when lawyers are engaged in
capital markets deals. While the lawyer-client relationship has principal
179. Some excellent examples do exist, however. See, e.g., Utset, supra note 3, at 275–
80; see also Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 247–55 (1999) (describing corporate outputs as the products of
team, rather than principal-agent efforts).
180. See Alchian and Demsetz, supra note 10, at 777.
181. See, e.g., JACK D. OSBORN ET AL., SELF-DIRECTED WORK TEAMS: THE NEW
AMERICAN CHALLENGE (1990); see also Paul Osterman, Supervision, Discretion, and Work
Organization, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 380, 380–84 (1994).
182. See, e.g., Croson & Mnookin, supra note 9, at 331–34 (analyzing the tension
between lawyers as agents and their clients as principals).
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and agency features, the lawyer in such situations does not simply await
orders from the client to act upon; the lawyers help to shape those wishes
by conveying advice and information about what is appropriate and wise in
a given context.183 They often help to prompt the client to action and
inform them about what they should be doing at a given point in time in the
deal.184
Relationships and repeated interactions play a critical role in establishing
good team processes.185 The relational dynamics emerging from repeated
interactions have the capacity to produce significantly better team
performance and, in theory, better output.186 One common feature of teams
that perform well is familiarity among the team members and experience
working together multiple times in the past.187 This point is illustrated in a
study conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
showing that team functioning, rather than mechanical problems or
technical ability of individual pilots, is the key cause of most airline
accidents.188 This study highlights a fact which is born out in NTSB
statistics: that 73 percent of accidents in its database occurred on a crew’s
first day flying together, and 44 percent of those accidents happened on the
crew’s very first flight.189 Research on airline crews and teams of doctors
further shows that experienced teams who have worked together in the past
perform significantly better—even when fatigued—than do rested crews
who have not worked together before.190 Relational benefits translate to
deals as well. Parties involved develop trust and learn each others’ norms
for communication, language coding, risk tolerance, preferences, preferred

183. See Blair & Stout, supra note 179, at 259 (“[P]art of the agent’s job is to figure out
what needs to be done (a situation we suspect is the norm rather than the exception in most
public corporations). A related point is that the principal-agent model assumes that it is clear
who the principal is and who the agent is in the particular relationship or transaction under
study. Yet many of the most important relationships inside corporations may be more
ambiguous, in the sense that both parties may be contributing productive inputs and neither
may have authority over the other.”).
184. This point will be familiar to many who have practiced in capital markets and was
confirmed by practitioner interviews.
185. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 81 (“In that sense, team cognitive
structures, emergent states, and routinized behavior patterns are the echoes of repeated
process interactions and, hence, are indicative of the nature and quality of dynamic team
processes.”).
186. See id.
187. See id. (“[R]epeated interactions among individuals that constitute processes tend to
regularize, such that shared structures . . . crystallize and then serve to guide subsequent
process interactions. Process begets structure, which in turn guides process.”).
188. See Robert L. Helmreich, On Error Management: Lessons from Aviation, 320 BMJ
781, 781–85 (2000); J. Bryan Sexton et al., Error, Stress, and Teamwork in Medicine and
Aviation: Cross Sectional Surveys, 320 BMJ 745, 745–49 (2000); see also Kozlowski &
Ilgen, supra note 84, at 86–87 (explaining an experiment where teams were given the task of
creating origami birds and became more efficient when they repeated the task together, but
less efficient when members of the team were replaced with new members).
189. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250.
190. See Kozlowski & Ilgen, supra note 84, at 77–81.
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roles, strengths, weaknesses, and working styles.191 As lawyer and client
come to better understand each other, the lawyer is more able to anticipate
his or her client’s needs, negotiating positions, and areas of focus.192 The
lawyer can act as a better agent in managing the transaction and in dealing
with the issuer and its counsel in the conduct of due diligence and
disclosure drafting. The investment bank client, in turn, is freer to engage
in the business-oriented side of the deal, with an informational and legal
product that matches its expectations and needs. Thus, the client is able to
focus on marketing, negotiating, and engaging in other activities within its
expertise that are needed to make the deal successful.
2. Making the Whole Better than the Sum of Its Parts
While good teamwork can be beneficial, it does not necessarily appear
spontaneously, and optimal team dynamics must be cultivated. Team
efforts are generally found to be better than individual ones, but it is not
always the case that teams produce gains exceeding those of the sum of
their parts.193 Groups can suffer from process losses, such as coordination,
and motivation problems can erode the benefit of team effort.194 This
reality has been born out in experiments comparing actual teams and
“nominal” teams (teams that never work together but whose output is
constructed by aggregating the output of each individual) in the
performance of a given task.195 In many of these experiments, adding the
output of members of the nominal team produces results that are as good as
or better than those obtained by the actual teams.196 This research suggests
that teams do not automatically get better results simply by virtue of being a
team.197 Repeated interaction appears to aid team dynamics over time, but
other useful team skills may be less intuitive.198 Creating an effective team
requires certain conditions to be met, and the presence of those conditions
will increase the likelihood that a team will function well.199 In addition,
research suggests that collaboration among lawyers may become harder to
achieve when the lawyers face performance pressure, or when a client
situation is perceived to be high stakes.200 An IPO can easily become such
191. See id. at 84 (“[W]e conclude that a shared team mental model that captures the
structure of relations among key aspects of the team, its task and role system, and its
environment is a key emergent cognitive structure that shapes coordination processes
relevant to team goals and their accomplishment.”); see also Schneider et al., supra note 16,
at 17–19 (discussing the importance of coordination among deal team members and the need
to have a common understanding of the tasks to be accomplished).
192. See id.
193. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 249–50.
194. See generally IVAN D. STEINER, GROUP PROCESS AND PRODUCTIVITY (1972).
195. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 246.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 254.
198. Id. at 249–50 (discussing elements of high performing teams that are not necessarily
intuitive).
199. Id. at 248.
200. See Heidi K. Gardner, Effective Teamwork and Collaboration, in MANAGING
TALENT FOR SUCCESS 145, 145–46 (Rebecca Normand-Hochman ed., 2013) (discussing
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a situation. It is worth considering how to improve upon lawyers’ relational
skill to avoid some of these problems. Best practices, including relatively
simple but effective interventions such as appointing a definite leader,
clearly defining roles, explicitly expressing norms of behavior, and setting
concrete expectations can improve collaboration but do not necessarily
happen naturally.201 In addition, further research would be useful to
discover how lawyers might be able to foster better collaboration and
leverage some of the benefits of familiarity, even without the benefit of
repeated interactions with other lawyers or clients. For example, a more
intentional focus on group processes and communication norms might lead
to better group interaction without having to learn by trial and error.
Moreover, learning to recognize and diagnose group process problems early
on might lead to better collaboration even without repeated interactions.
That relational skill can have such a large impact on a transaction implies
that collaboration and teamwork should be further addressed in the legal
profession in order to garner more of its benefits. It is often assumed that
members of teams do not require any particular additional skills to be
effective team members.202 That is rarely the case. This may be especially
true for individuals trained as lawyers, given the individualistic nature of
many of the pursuits that gain recognition in legal education.203 If it is true
that relational skill and effective teamwork can have a significant and
tangible impact on the substantive outcomes of a business transaction, then
relational skill should be added alongside technical knowledge of regulation
and value creation in the set of tools important to transaction cost
engineering. It is worth considering how a lawyer’s team management and
process management skills come into play in this context and how they
might be honed and enhanced.
In addition to familiarity and repeated interaction, research has identified
conditions which facilitate effective collaboration and without which
collaboration rarely yields results better than what individuals can do on
their own. These conditions include: setting clear boundaries for group
membership and involvement, ensuring that team members have a clear
idea of the team’s goals and direction, allowing individuals’ various levels
of expertise to be leveraged, providing clear norms of conduct, and
providing ample opportunities for feedback and direction on the group’s
processes.204 While these conditions may seem simple, they are often
overlooked. In addition, many groups harbor incorrect assumptions about
what makes teamwork successful. One such assumption concerns the roles
of team leaders. While leaders are important for setting direction, it is
typically better for leaders to set up the conditions that facilitate team
research indicating that lawyers become less creative, and more risk averse and less likely to
collaborate, when they perceive the stakes to be high).
201. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 254–56.
202. Id. at 254.
203. See id. (noting that individualistic work cultures may not readily lend themselves to
collaboration).
204. See id. at 264–66.
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functioning, as opposed to being overly directive, or overly hands-off.205
Another commonly held assumption is that contrarian attitudes are
corrosive to team behavior. While someone who is overly averse to
teamwork may be ill-suited for group work, groups tend to function best
when they have a member who challenges group assumptions and
orthodoxies.206 Without the voice of dissent, groups can become mediocre,
and fall into patterns of groupthink. The problem is that most participants
in group work tend to shy away from challenging orthodoxies, believing
that it will create conflict and disrupt the group dynamic.207
These are just a few examples, and this Article does not purport to
provide an exhaustive list of ways in which group processes can be tweaked
so that deal teams can perform optimally. However, the legal profession
would have much to gain from further consideration of how to capture more
benefits from group processes in deal making. It is worth considering how
such skills can be taught to practicing lawyers as well as law students. At
the very least, team skills should receive more emphasis and study than
they currently do, and an awareness of relational dynamics should be
incorporated into law school as well as continuing education curricula. It is
also worth considering how the incentive structures that exist in most law
practices might be tweaked to reward team performance, as opposed to
individual performance, such as billable hour targets which bear
relationship to firm profitability in the short term without necessarily
bearing any relationship to the lawyers’ ability to best serve clients.
3. Managing Drawbacks of Teamwork
Group collaboration also deserves attention in the transactional context
because of its potential to conflict with a lawyer’s agency duties. The
group production task that lawyers are involved in when doing an IPO
necessarily involves partisan interests. So-called groupthink and other
byproducts of team production may poorly serve clients whose interests
diverge from those of others at the table.208 This may detract from the
benefits of team functioning and undermine the lawyer’s central role as
advocate for his or her client. One means of managing the tension is to
develop a better understanding of when the role of team member and agent
are likely to come into conflict. This in turn requires a better understanding
of where parties’ interests might diverge.
However, simply understanding where interests diverge is an incomplete
solution. Lawyers must know how and when to raise issues and not feel the
pressure of the group to suppress concerns. At first glance, it may seem
that identifying divergence of interest might be antithetical to good team
function. However, the ability to raise conflicts is an important component

205.
206.
05.
207.
208.

See id. at 265–66.
See Diane Coutu, Why Teams Don’t Work, HARV. BUS. REV., May 2009, at 99, 102–
See id.
See Kozlowski et al., supra note 84, at 77, 81.
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of team functioning, and finding ways to do so may in fact enhance team
dynamics.209 Research on team dynamics suggests that one component of
highly effective teams is a set of norms and practices governing dispute
resolution.210 A more explicit understanding of the interaction between
agency and teamwork and norms promoting productive avenues of dissent
when necessary would allow deal lawyers to leverage team dynamics while
still remaining zealous advocates.
Lawyers’ process expertise is
particularly suited to designing and implementing such systems, and further
education and research in this area would yield enormous benefits to
transactional lawyers.
B. Further Considerations
While a detailed catalogue of recommendations is beyond the scope of
this Article, I will briefly summarize some preliminary proposals and areas
for future research. The first basic proposal that the empirical findings of
this Article suggest is that previous relationships might be important
disclosure to investors in securities markets. If familiarity between lawyers
and bankers are significantly related to the way a stock performs in the
market, then investors might be well served by having that information. It
may well be the case that the “reasonable” investor may not know or care
about the effects of repeated interactions. However, market analysts and
others who provide them with information may find the disclosure more
useful and incorporate it into their analysis of stock.
The second overarching proposal suggested by the findings above is that
law should focus more on the impact of relational ability as a core
component of effective legal practice. Though other professions have
incorporated teamwork and collaboration as a crucial component of
professional education, law has been slow to embrace it. Business schools
and medical schools routinely incorporate team tasks and skills training into
their basic curriculum, based on compelling research that good teamwork
fosters better results and poor teamwork fosters mistakes. With respect to
law, team skills are equally important, and perhaps critical to a lawyer’s
ability to add value in a deal. While this Article has focused on
transactions, in the litigation context lawyers frequently work in teams as
well. In fact, in a law firm practice of any size, lawyers frequently engage
in team tasks and could serve their clients far better if such tasks were
optimally structured.
However, for lawyers, the team dynamic takes on additional
complications. This suggests that not only are team skills important, but so
is the complex skill of balancing team productivity with advocacy. If
familiarity has benefits for deal outcomes, it may have drawbacks as well,
particularly for the deal lawyer, who must balance the competing concerns
of advocacy with the coordination and cooperation that facilitate deal
209. See PFEIFFER BOOK OF SUCCESSFUL TEAM-BUILDING TOOLS 247–65 (Elaine Biech,
ed. 2008); Hackman, supra note 6, at 255.
210. See Hackman, supra note 6, at 250.
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making. Simply working repeatedly with other members of a deal team is
not enough to promote better deal outcomes, as demonstrated by the results
for repeated interactions between sets of lawyers. Leveraging the benefits
of teamwork without sacrificing the duty of agency will involve more
intentional consideration of both and a more complex model of the deal
negotiations than is typically described.
CONCLUSION
To ask how lawyers add value is to miss half the equation. In
transactional practice, lawyers and clients add value by working together
effectively to accomplish a common aim. This Article provides evidence
that repeated lawyer-client interaction leads to better substantive deal
outcomes. This is a conclusion that should come as little surprise, but it has
not previously been documented to the same degree. The results suggest
that lawyers do their best work when they form effective teams with their
clients because they establish trust and learn how to optimize their roles,
communication styles, and preferences. This is a natural product of
repeated interactions, but it can also be enhanced by more intentional
awareness of the importance of team dynamics. Precisely how lawyers can
work better with clients is an issue that warrants further study, but it is clear
that lawyers would benefit if the issue were addressed earlier in their
training and more directly. Law schools currently lack much training
relating to teams or managing group processes, a feature which puts law
students behind peers in professions like business and medicine. Moreover,
these topics are virtually absent from continuing legal education.
Nonetheless, if lawyers are to be effective “transaction cost engineers,”
these skills are essential, particularly at a time when the value of legal
education is in question and corporate clients complain that lawyers lack
value additive skills.
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APPENDIX
Appendix Figure A:
Variables Analyzed
Independent Variables of
Interest: Types of Lawyer
Interactions Tested

Dependent Variables

Control Variables

(IPOs together within the preceding 1
year, 2 years, and 3 years)



Lead Underwriter—
Underwriter’s Counsel
Issuer’s Counsel—
Underwriter’s Counsel














First trading day price
change
Price change relative to the
S&P Index at 30 days, 60
days, 90 days post-offering
Probability of correct price
revision
Probability of securities
class action litigation at 6
months, 1 year, and 3 years
post-offering
Prospectus size
Risk Factor proportion
MD&A proportion
Time to deal completion
(length of time from the
filing of Form S-1 to the
offer date)
Whether deal final price is
integer or decimal






















Offering size (as the log of
gross proceeds)
IPO Year fixed effects (a
dummy variable for each
year in the sample)
IPO Industry fixed effects (a
dummy variable for each
industry in the sample, using
the SEC’s 3-digit SIC
codes)
Bank fixed effects (a
dummy variable for each
lead underwriting bank)
Syndicate size
Log age of the Issuer
Lead Underwriter quality
(according to number of
IPOs performed)
Lead Underwriter quality
(by dollar market share for
the preceding calendar year)
Law firm experience (as the
number of IPO deals each
law firm has performed in
the preceding 1 year, 2 year,
and 3 year periods)
Presence of venture capital
firms
Size of inside shareholder
stake sold into deal
Log of company total assets
Company book value per
share
Geographic location of law
firm (by city and ZIP Code)
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Appendix Figure B:
Summary Statistics

N

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Total IPO Deals

2,265

Lead Underwriters

2,729*

1.40

1.00

0.82

Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together:
Past 1 Year

2,729*

1.80

1.00

1.59

Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together:
Past 2 Years

2,729*

2.20

1.00

2.21

Underwriter-Counsel Deals Together:
Past 3 Years

2,729*

2.46

1.00

2.62

Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel
Deals Together: Past 1 Year

2,268*

1.77

1.00

2.15

Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel
Deals Together: Past 2 Years

2,268*

2.16

1.00

3.17

Underwriter Counsel-Issuer Counsel
Deals Together: Past 3 Years

2,268*

2.46

1.00

4.02

First Day Price Increase (percent)

2,725*

0.28

0.11

0.59

Log (gross proceeds)

2,729*

17.96

17.93

1.06

Company Age (years)

2,265

12.80

7.00

18.21

Syndicate Size (number of banks)

2,265

11.41

9.00

8.29

* A number of deals involve more than one lead underwriter, which creates more observations than deals. Observations are de-weighted
accordingly to account for this.
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Appendix Table 1:
Opening Day Performance and Repeated Interactions
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
(1)

(2)

0.049***
(0.011)

0.030*
(0.012)

(3)

(4)

0.033***
(0.007)

0.019*
(0.0078)

(5)

(6)

0.0257***
(0.0057)

0.014*
(0.006)

Panel A:
Lead Underwriter
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals Together
in the Past Year
Deals Together
in the Past 2
Years
Deals Together
in the Past 3
Years
0.067***
(0.012)

0.054***
(0.016)

0.0668***
(0.0115)

0.053***
(0.0156)

0.0678***
(0.0116)

0.053***
(0.016)

Adj. R2

0.20

0.27

0.20

0.27

0.20

0.27

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

0.021**
(0.007)

0.015
(0.008)
0.017**
(0.052)

0.011
(0.005)

0.015***
(0.004)

0.009*
(0.005)

Log Gross
Proceeds

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel &
Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together
in the Past Year
Deals Together
in the Past 2
Years
Deals Together
in the Past 3
Years
Log Gross
Proceeds

0.0695***
(0.012)

0.048**
(0.016)

0.071***
(0.0121)

0.050**
(0.0156)

0.072***
(0.012)

0.051**
(0.015)

Adj. R2

0.18

0.26

0.18

0.26

0.18

026

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,725

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Bank Dummies

X

X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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Appendix Table 2:
30, 60 & 90 Day Price Performance
Dependent Variable: Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index
(1)

30-Day
(2)

(3)

(4)

60-Day
(5)

(6)

(7)

90-Day
(8)

(9)

Panel A:
Underwriters’
Counsel &
Managing
Underwriter
Deals
Together
in the Past
Year

0.044***
(0.013)

Deals
Together
in the Past
2 Years

0.068***
(0.019)

0.033***
(0.009)

Deals
Together
in the Past
3 Years

0.074***
(0.024)

0.043***
(0.012)

0.028***
(0.007)

0.049***
(0.015)

0.034***
(0.012)

0.041***
(0.013)

Adj. R2

0.09

0.09

0.09

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.13

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,721

2,721

2,721

2,720

2,720

2,720

Panel B:
Issuer’s Counsel
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals
Together
in the Past
Year

0.022*
(0.009)

Deals
Together
in the Past
2 Years

0.038*
(0.016)

0.016*
(0.007)

Deals
Together
in the Past
3 Years

0.041*
(0.017)

0.030*
(0.012)

0.013*
(0.006)

0.039**
(0.013)

0.025*
(0.010)

0.034**
(0.011)

Adj. R2

0.08

0.08

0.08

0.12

0.12

0.12

0.13

0.13

0.13

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,725

2,725

2,721

2,721

2,721

2,720

2,720

2,720

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry*
Year
Dummies

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases.
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Appendix Table 3:
Probit Analysis of Upward Revision for Strong Performers
Dependent Variable: Upward Revision
(1)

(2)

(3)

20% Bounce

(4)
30% Bounce

Panel A: Lead
Underwriter &
Underwriters’
Counsel
Frequent Collaborator

0.270**
(0.109)

0.262**
(0.113)

0.231+
(0.124)

0.224+
(0.129)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.582***
(0.078)

0.597***
(0.084)

0.486***
(0.910)

0.485***
(0.100)

Marginal Effect (frequent)

0.093**
(0.037)

0.087**
(0.037)

0.079+
(0.043)

0.078+
(0.045)

964

906

698

625

0.12

0.15

0.10

0.11

Frequent Collaborator

0.120
(0.096)

0.142
(0.101)

0.058
(0.111)

0.098
(0.118)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.591***
(0.079)

0.608***
(0.085)

0.498***
(0.092)

0.499***
(0.100)

Marginal Effect (frequent)

0.042
(0.033)

0.047
(0.034)

0.021
(0.038)

0.034
(0.041)

Number of Observations
Pseudo R

2

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s
Counsel

Number of Observations

964

906

698

625

Pseudo R2

0.12

0.15

0.10

0.11

Industry Dummies

X

X

X

X

IPO Year Dummies

X

X

X

X

Industry*Year Dummies

X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each
bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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Appendix Table 4:
Probit Analysis of Probability of Class Action Litigation
Dependent Variable: Securities Class Action Litigation Filed
Within 6 Months
of Offer Date

Within 1 Year
of Offer Date

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Deals Together in the
Preceding 1 Year

-0.002
(0.039)

-0.004
(0.428)

0.003
(0.027)

-0.021
(0.030)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.237***
(0.057)

0.254***
(0.070)

0.254***
(0.469)

0.244***
(0.056)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.0007
(0.002)

-0.0003
(0.003)

0.0002
(0.002)

-0.002
(0.003)

Number of Observations

2,639

1,386

2,705

1,885

Pseudo R2

0.12

0.16

0.07

0.09

Deals Together in the
Preceding 1 Year

-0.120+
(0.061)

-0.151+
(0.057)

0.002
(0.024)

-0.004
(0.025)

Log Gross Proceeds

0.262***
(0.073)

0.334***
(0.094)

0.288***
(0.057)

0.323***
(0.071)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.005+
(0.002)

-0.01+
(0.005)

0.0001
(0.002)

0.0005
(0.002)

Number of Observations

2,202

979

2,253

1,416

Panel A: Lead
Underwriter &
Underwriters’
Counsel

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel & Issuer’s
Counsel

Pseudo R

2

0.12

0.19

0.075

0.98

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

IPO Year Dummies

X

X

X

X

Bank Dummies

X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with +, *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%,
and 0.1% level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners;
each bank is treated as being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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Appendix Table 5:
Time to Completion from S-1 Filing
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 Filing to Offer Date (in days)
(1)

(2)

-2.52***
(0.916)

-1.76***
(0.580)

(3)

(4)

-1.88**
(0.66)

-0.883
(0.490)

(5)

(6)

-1.70***
(0.577)

-0.75
(0.427)

Panel A:
Lead Underwriter
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals Together
in the Preceding
1 Year
Deals Together
in the Preceding
2 Years
Deals Together
in the Preceding
3 Years
Log Gross
Proceeds

-8.17***
(2.50)

-9.73***
(1.50)

-10.55***
(2.56)

-9.83***
(1.50)

-10.48***
(2.55)

-9.83***
(1.50)

6.27
(3.70)

5.87***
(1.99)

5.53
(3.07)

5.97***
(1.99)

5.54
(3.07)

6.01***
(1.99)

Adj. R2

0.22

0.31

0.32

0.23

0.20

0.32

Number of
Observations

2,723

2,723

2,723

2,723

2,723

2,723

-0.794
(0.583)

-0.114
(0.483)

-0.590
(0.429)

-0.104
(0.372)

-0.622
(0.344)

-0.184
(0.300)

Lead
Underwriting
Bank

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel &
Issuer’s Counsel
Deals Together
in the Preceding
1 Year
Deals Together
in the Preceding
2 Years
Deals Together
in the Preceding
3 Years
Log Gross
Proceeds

-12.85***
(2.71)

-10.91***
(1.61)

-12.86***
(2.72)

-10.91
(1.61)

-12.85
(2.71)

-10.89
(1.61)

7.29
(4.98)

5.99
(3.22)

7.25
(4.97)

5.99
(3.21)

7.26
(4.97)

5.98
(3.21)

Adj. R2

0.15

0.26

0.15

0.26

0.15

0.26

Number of
Observations

2,263

2,2063

2,263

2,263

2,263

2,263

Lead
Underwriting
Bank
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Appendix Table 5 continued
Dependent Variable: Length of Time from S-1 filing to Offer Date (in days)
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Quarter
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry
Dummies*
IPO Quarter
Dummies
All Deals
Deal Length <
365 Days

X

X
X

X
X

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
The sample for this analysis was limited to deals that are completed in 365 days or less from the filing of the S-1. The reason for limiting
the sample in this way is to give a more accurate picture of the effect of counsel interactions. The majority of transactions in the dataset are
completed within one year of filing of the S-1, and the presence of a number of outlier deals that took much longer than one year biased
estimate of increased efficiency upward.
In addition, as the dependent variable in this specification is a time period less than one year long, a quarter-year fixed effect is used
instead of the IPO-year fixed effect used in other specifications.
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Appendix Table 6:
Probit Analysis of the Effects of Interactions on Probability
of Non-Integer Pricing
Dependent Variable: Non-Integer Offering Price
(1)

(2)

Panel A:
Lead Underwriter
& Underwriters’
Counsel
Deals Together in the
Preceding 1 Year

-0.062*
(0.026)

-0.064*
(0.028)

-0.486***
(0.079)

0.508***
(0.081)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.013*
(0.006)

-0.013*
(0.005)

Number of Observations

2,723

2,604

Pseudo R2

0.09

0.11

Deals Together in the
Preceding year

-0.071*
(0.030)

-0.075*
(0.032)

Log Opening Price

0.448***
(0.087)

0.492***
(0.089)

Marginal
Effect (of collaboration)

-0.015*
(0.006)

-0.015*
(0.007)

Number of Observations

2,264

2,200

Log Opening Price

Panel B:
Underwriters’
Counsel
& Issuer’s Counsel

Pseudo R

2

0.08

0.10

Industry
Dummies

X

X

IPO Year Dummies

X

X

Industry*Year Dummies

X

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
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Appendix Table 7:
Alternative Specification—
Opening Day Price Increase Outcome Variable
(1)

(2)

UnderwriterUnderwriter’s
Counsel: Deals in the
Past 1 Year

Underwriter’s CounselIssuer’s Counsel: Deals in
the Last 1 Year

0.049***
(0.011)

0.021**
(0.007)

(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 40 IPO
deals

0.029*
(0.013)

0.029**
(0.012)

(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 80 IPO
deals

0.041*
(0.018)

0.031
(0.017)

(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar market share for IPOs in
preceding year

0.044***
(0.011)

0.033***
(0.010)

(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for IPOs
in preceding year

0.048***
(0.011)

0.027***
(0.011)

(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1 year

0.048***
(0.011)

0.027**
(0.011)

(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years

0.049***
(0.011)

0.029***
(0.010)

(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years

0.049***
(0.012)

0.029***
(0.010)

(9) Excluding Wilson Sonsini (outlier firm in number of deals)

0.049***
(0.011)

0.035***
(0.012)

(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in
the dataset

0.072***
(0.019)

0.031***
(0.011)

(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank
relationships

0.053***
(0.012)

0.033***
(0.009)

(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in number of years since
founding

0.049***
(0.011)

0.031***
(0.009)

(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of
years since founding

0.048***
(0.011)

0.030***
(0.009)

(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to
IPO

0.047***
(0.011)

0.030***
(0.009)

(15) IPO quarter instead of year

0.048***
(0.011)

0.031***
(0.010)

(16) Removing the year 1999

0.039***
(0.011)

0.022***
(0.008)

(17) Removing the year 2000

0.037***
(0.011)

0.033***
(0.013)

(1) Preferred estimate—with standard controls (standard errors)
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number
of deals

Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar
marketshare

Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals
done

Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms

Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer
risk

Altering year control categories
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Appendix Table 8:
Alternative Specifications for Correct Upward Price Revision*
(1)

(2)

UnderwriterUnderwriter’s
Counsel: Deals in the
Past 1 Year

Underwriter’s CounselIssuer’s Counsel: Deals in
the Past 1 Year

0.087*
(0.037)

0.047
(0.034)

(2) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 40
IPO deals

0.100*
(0.043)

0.034
(0.043)

(3) Limiting sample to biggest Lead Underwriters: more than 80
IPO deals

0.064
(0.057)

-0.013
(0.056)

(4) Controlling for Lead Underwriter dollar marketshare for IPOs in
preceding year

0.054**
(0.020)

0.013
(0.018)

(5) Limiting sample to banks with highest dollar marketshare for
IPOs in preceding year

0.081***
(0.023)

0.011
(0.022)

(6) Controlling for number of IPOs done by law firm in the past 1
year

0.062**
(0.021)

0.0064**
(0.019)

(7) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 2 years

0.060**
(0.021)

0.005
(0.019)

(8) Controlling for number of IPOs done in the past 3 years

0.056**
(0.021)

0.003***
(0.019)

(9) Fixed effect for Wilson Sonsini
(outlier firm in number of deals )

0.060***
(0.019)

-0.008
(0.019)

(10) Removing Lead Underwriters’ most frequently used law firm in
the dataset

0.059**
(0.028)

0.019
(0.021)

(11) Removing anecdotally reported “favorite” law firm-bank
relationships

0.059**
(0.021)

0.022
(0.018)

(1) Preferred estimate—with standard controls (standard errors)
Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured by number
of deals

Calibrating for quality of Lead Underwriter—measured dollar
marketshare

Calibrating for law firm experience—measured by number of deals
done

Calibrating for Lead Underwriters’ use of “favorite” law firms
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Appendix Table 8 continued
(1)

(2)

UnderwriterUnderwriter’s
Counsel: Deals in the
Past 1 Year

Underwriter’s CounselIssuer’s Counsel: Deals in
the Past 1 Year

(12) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the number of years
since founding

0.072***
(0.019)

0.025
(0.019)

(13) Controlling for the age of the Issuer in the log of the number of
years since founding

0.072***
(0.019)

0.025
(0.019)

0.065***
(0.020)

0.014
(0.018)

0.084***
(0.020)

0.026
(0.021)

(18) Removing the year 1999

0.080***
(0.022)

-0.0007
(0.020)

(19) Removing the year 2000

0.060*
(0.022)

0.005
(0.19)

Calibrating for availability of information about the Issuer/issuer
risk

(14) Controlling for the presence of venture capital investors prior to
IPO
Altering year controls
(17) IPO quarter instead of year

Marginal effects reported. Alternative specifications for other models and outcomes of interest similarly support the estimates from the
preferred specifications discussed in this Article. Those alternative specifications are not reported here for the sake of space economy.
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Appendix Table 9:
Limiting to IPOs Managed by Largest Banks—
Underwriter & Underwriter’s Counsel
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
Deals Together in
the Past Year

(1)

(2)

0.029*
(0.013)

0.041*
(0.018)

Deals Together in
the Past 2 Years

(3)

(4)

0.019*
(0.008)

0.026*
(0.011)

Deals Together in
the Past 3 Years

(5)

(6)

0.013*
(0.0064)

0.019*
(0.008)

Log Gross
Proceeds

0.049*
(0.019)

0.056**
(0.0212)

0.0487*
(0.0192)

0.055**
(0.0210)

0.0485*
(0.0191)

0.056**
(0.0211)

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Bank Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Manager>=40

X

Manager>=80

X
X

X
X

X

Adj. R2

0.28

0.26

0.28

0.26

0.28

0.26

Number of
Observations

1,534

940

1,534

940

1,534

940

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%
level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is
treated as being a manager in such cases.
The table above reports the results of OLS regressions testing the possibility that selection is driving the observed increase in IPO market
performance in the periods studied. The table reports tests using the main specification for the opening day price jump and repeated
interactions between the Lead Underwriter and its counsel, but this time limiting the sample to banks that manage at least 40 issues in the
dataset (the top 18 banks), and to banks that manage at least 80 issues in the dataset (the top 7 banks).
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Appendix Table 10:
Negative Disclosure
Panel A: Underwriter
& Underwriters’ Counsel
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1)
Deals Together in
the Past 1 Year

(2)

(3)

0.309***
(0.057)
0.200***
(0.040)

Deals Together in
the Past 2 Years

0.150***
(0.035)

Deals Together in
the Past 3 Years
Industry Dummies

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

Adj. R2

0.14

0.14

0.14

Number of
Observations

2,247

2,247

2,247

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1%
level, respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is
treated as being a manager in such cases.
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Appendix Table 10 continued
Panel B: Underwriter’s Counsel
& Issuer’s Counsel
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Prospectus Devoted to Risk Factors
(1)
Deals Together in
the Past 1 Year

(2)

(3)

0.190***
(0.043)
0.173***
(0.031)

Deals Together in
the Past 2 Years

0.151***
(0.024)

Deals Together in
the Past 3 Years
Industry Dummies

X

X

X

IPO Year
Dummies

X

X

X

Industry*Year
Dummies

X

X

X

Adj. R2

0.09

0.09

0.09

Number of
Observations

2,247

2,247

2,247

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases.
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Appendix Table 11:
Lawyer Experience on IPO Deals—
First Day Price Increase
Dependent Variable: Opening Day Price Jump %
IPO Deals Done
in the Past Year

(1)

(2)

0.0013
(0.0018)

0.0013
(0.002)

Deals Done in
the Past 2 Years

(3)

(4)

0.0008
(0.0011)

0.0007
(0.0011)

Deals Done in
the Past 3 Years

(5)

(6)

0.0009
(0.0009)

0.0007
(0.0009)

Log Gross
Proceeds

0.072***
(0.012)

0.068***
(0.012)

0.068***
(0.012)

0.068***
(0.011)

0.069***
(0.011)

0.049***
(0.014)

Repeated Past
Client
Interactions in
Corresponding
Number of
Years

0.049***
(0.0116)

0.029*
(0.013)

0.033***
(0.008)

0.019*
(0.008)

0.024***
(0.006)

0.012+
(0.007)

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Industry* Year
Dummies

X

X

X

X

X

X

Bank
Dummies

X

X

X

Adj. R2

0.20

0.27

0.20

0.27

0.20

0.26

Number of
Observations

2,725

2,719

2,725

2,719

2,725

2,719

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases, and the weight of each such observation is reduced.
This table reports the results of OLS regressions testing whether the results in the main specification are driven by the law firm’s level of
recent experience (and thus are selection-driven). Law firm experience is measured by the number of IPOs done by a particular law firm
within the past 1 year, 2 years, and 3 years. The number of deals is a variable constructed by looking at the number of IPOs done by the
law firm in the relevant timespan prior to the offer date of every IPO that comprises an observation. Industry and year-fixed effects, as
well as a fixed effect for the interaction of year and industry, are used to isolate the effect of lawyer experience regardless of industry and
time period. As shown, the effect of law firm deal experience in the recent past (accounting for industry and time period) is very small and
disappears when the variable for repeated interactions is introduced as a control. The same analysis with respect to other outcomes of
interest yields similar results, but is not reported here for space economy.
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Appendix Table 12:
Price Performance and Counsel Experience
(by Number of Recent Deals)
Dependent Variable: Percentage Price Change Relative to S&P Index
(1)
Deals
Done in
the Past
Year

30-Day
(2)

0.0021
(0.0035)

Deals
Done in
the Past 2
Years

(4)

60-Day
(5)

(6)

0.0090
(0.0060)

0.0014
(0.0024)

Deals
Done in
the Past 3
Years

Industry
Dummies

(3)

(7)

90-Day
(8)

(9)

0.0071
(0.006)

0.0054
(0.0038)

0.0021
(0.0018)

0.0055
(0.0042)

0.0054
(0.0029)

0.0053
(0.003)

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Adj. R2

0.09

0.09

0.09

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.13

0.13

Number
of
Observations

2,719

2,719

2,719

2,715

2,715

2,715

2,714

2,714

2,714

IPO Year
Dummies
Industry*
Year
Dummies

Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Estimates marked with *, **, and *** are statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level,
respectively. The number of observations is greater than the number of IPOs due to IPOs with joint bookrunners; each bank is treated as
being a manager in such cases.

